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I. INTRODUCTION
When an elementary or secondary school student is harassed at
school, the harassment is likely to interfere with the student's educa-
tion. If such harassment is motivated by the victim's race or gender, it
constitutes a form or race or gender discrimination because the victim
© Copyright held by the NEBRAsKA LAW REEvW.
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is subjected to different conditions based on race or gender. Because
educational institutions may not deprive students of equal educa-
tional opportunities based on race or gender, school officials have a
duty to address such harassment. This duty becomes more obvious
when school officials, such as teachers, are directly involved in the
harassment than when fellow students are engaged in the harassing
conduct. Peer harassment in schools raises difficult legal issues be-
cause fellow students rather than school officials are the problem, at
least initially. Thus, the issue is whether schools and their officials
can be held liable for the inequality in educational opportunity that
results from peer harassment. This article suggests the answer
should be yes. A second, less complex issue is whether the students
responsible for the harassment, or at least their parents, can be held
liable.' In addressing these issues, it is necessary to distinguish be-
tween public and private schools because some of the relevant laws
apply only to government officials and entities. 2
Accordingly, and to lay the foundation, the well-documented exis-
tence of racial and sexual harassment in secondary and elementary
schools will be summarized in section II of this article. Prevention of
harassment will be discussed in section III, with emphasis on the effi-
cacy of strong policies, accompanying education, and prompt correc-
tive action by school officials to ensure students harassment-free
educational opportunities.
Finally, section IV will discuss the potential remedies for the stu-
dent victims of student harassment in schools. First, victims of such
harassment may have claims against the students who actually en-
gaged in the harassment, based on civil rights statutes and common
law tort theories. Second, victims may have state law claims that seek
to hold parents liable for the actions of their children. In many situa-
tions, neither the students nor their parents will be able to satisfy a
judgment, so victims will attempt to hold schools and school officials
liable. A key to holding schools and their officials liable is a showing
that they knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to
take prompt, appropriate corrective action. However, as mentioned
before, elementary and secondary schools have an affirmative duty to
1. Because students are less likely than the school corporation, or even school offi-
cials, to have the resources to satisfy a substantial judgment, they are less attrac-
tive defendants. In some states, parents can be held responsible for the torts of
their children, at least up to a certain amount. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 34-31-4-1
(1998).
2. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution applies only to state and local government actors. Similarly, the
civil rights statute pursuant to which the Fourteenth Amendment is enforced, 42
U.S.C. § 1983, requires action under state law. Private schools would generally
not satisfy the "state action" requirement. See e.g., Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457
U.S. 830 (1982).
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provide all children with an equal educational opportunity; that duty
includes identifying and removing harassment from all schools, both
public and private.
II. NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE PROBLEM
While the actual extent of racial and sexual harassment in elemen-
tary and secondary schools is not clear, reliable information suggests
that a problem exists. This is evident from the fact that the U.S. De-
partment of Education (DOE), the federal agency with the responsibil-
ity of enforcing two federal statutes that prohibit race and sex
discrimination in education, has published a "guidance" addressing
each of these two types of harassment. In its 1994 Racial Harassment
Guidance, the DOE stated, "[t]he existence of racial incidents and har-
assment on the basis of race, color, or national origin against students
is disturbing and of major concern to the Department."3 A few years
later, in its Sexual Harassment Guidance, the DOE noted:
The elimination of sexual harassment of students in federally assisted edu-
cational programs is a high priority for [the Office of Civil Rights]. Through
its enforcement of Title IX, OCR has learned that a significant number of stu-
dents, both male and female, have experienced sexual harassment, that sex-
ual harassment can interfere with a student's academic performance and
emotional and physical well-being, and that preventing and remedying sexual
harassment in schools is essential to ensure nondiscriminatory, safe environ-
ments in which students can learn.4
This represents an official recognition that both racial and sexual har-
assment are sufficiently prevalent in schools to warrant a specific gui-
dance addressing each form of harassment.
A frequently-cited study, "Hostile Hallways: The AAUW Survey on
Sexual Harassment in America's Schools," 5 presents the following
"Big Picture":
The startling findings on sexual harassment in The AAUW Report: How
Schools Shortchange Girls compelled the AAUW Educational Foundation to
undertake further research. We wanted to assess the extent of sexual harass-
ment in America's schools and, even more important, the effects of that har-
assment on our children.
AAUW commissioned one of this country's most respected survey research
firms, Louis Harris and Associates, to ensure that the survey's methodology,
implementation, and questionnaire would meet the highest standards of the
survey research community. The survey was designed to provide a profile of
3. Racial Incidents and Harassment Against Students at Educational Institutions;
Investigative Guidance, 59 Fed. Reg. 11,448 (March 10, 1994) [hereinafter Racial
Harassment Guidance].
4. Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students by School Employees,
Other Students, or Third Parties; Notice, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,033, 12,034 (March 13,
1997) [hereinafter Sexual Harassment Guidance].
5. American Association of University Women Educational Foundation, Hostile
Hallways: The AAUW Survey on Sexual Harassment in America's Schools (1993)
[hereinafter AAUW Survey].
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the problem of sexual harassment in school and answer many of the questions
about school-based sexual harassment. In addition to measuring the extent of
sexual harassment in school, AAUW was determined to identify the educa-
tional, emotional and behavioral impact of sexual harassment on our nation's
schoolchildren.
The results of this survey form a bleak picture: 4 out of 5 students have
experienced some form of sexual harassment in school. And while the impact
of sexual harassment in school is significant for all students, girls suffer
greater effects than boys. Further, the level of sexual harassment of boys is
surprisingly high.
For many, the analysis that follows will confirm their worst fears about
sexual harassment in school; for others, the results will be surprising and
shocking.
What will be clear to all is that sexual harassment in America's schools
affects-even disables-girls and boys alike.
What remains is the challenge facing students, teachers, and parents to
ensure that the behaviors detailed in this survey do not continue.
6
According to the AAUW survey, most of the harassment occurs in
the public areas of school facilities-in the halls, the classrooms, on
school grounds, in the cafeteria, or on school transportation. 7 The
harassment creates a substantial educational impact, with victims not
wanting to go to school, not wanting to talk as much in class, finding it
hard to pay attention in school, staying home or cutting classes, mak-
ing lower grades on tests and in class, and finding it hard to study.S
Harassment also has an emotional impact, with victims feeling em-
barrassed, feeling self-conscious, being less sure of themselves or less
confident, feeling afraid or scared, doubting whether they can have a
happy romantic relationship, and feeling confused about who they
are.9 The AAUW survey also addressed the behavioral impact of har-
assment.1o Another important finding in the AAUW survey shows
"that students do not routinely report sexual harassment incidents to
adults" and "most reporting takes place on a peer-to-peer basis."1 '
Other evidence, although not gathered as systematically as the
AAUW survey, supports the above conclusions. Examples, often out-
rageous, are found in reported cases, 12 law review articles 13 and
6. Id. at 4.
7. See id. at 12-14.
8. See id. at 15-16.
9. See id. at 16-17.
10. See id. at 17-18.
11. Id. at 14.
12. See, e.g., Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999); Soper ex rel.
Soper v. Hoben, 195 F.3d 845 (6th Cir. 1999); Murrell v. School Dist. No. 1, Den-
ver, CO, 186 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 1999); Bruneau ex rel. Schofield v. South Kort-
right Cent. Sch. Dist., 163 F.3d 749 (2d Cir. 1998); Monteiro v. Tempe Union
High Sch. Dist., 158 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 1998); Morse v. Regents of the Univ. of
Colo., 154 F.3d 1124 (10th Cir. 1998); Oona R.-S.- by Kate S. v. McCaffrey, 143
F.3d 473, opinion amended and reh'g denied,__ F.3d _ , 1998 WL 216944
(9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied 119 S. Ct. 2039 (1999); Franks v. Kentucky Sch. for
[Vol. 79:1
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newspaper articles. 14 While some may question whether student-stu-
dent harassment should result in litigation, the fact that these inci-
dents often end up in court demonstrates that other avenues of relief
are not available. Many of the injuries and much of the litigation
could be avoided if school officials would treat racial and sexual har-
assment as a serious matter and address it accordingly. As with many
problems, prevention is the best remedy.
the Deaf, 142 F.3d 360 (6th Cir. 1998); Bosley v. Kearney R-1 Sch. Dist., 140 F.3d
776 (8th Cir. 1998); Doe v. University of IM., 138 F.3d 653 (7th Cir. 1998), cert.
granted and opinion vacated 119 S. Ct. 2016 (1999); Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep.
Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006 (5th Cir. 1996); Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 54 F.3d
1447 (9th Cir. 1995); Doe v. Londonderry Sch. Dist. 970 F. Supp. 64 (D.N.H.
1997); Does v. Covington County Sch. Bd., 969 F. Supp. 1264 (N.D. Ala. 1997);
Nicole M. v. Martinez Unified Sch. Dist., 964 F. Supp. 1369 (N.D. Cal. 1997);
Collier v. William Penn Sch. Dist., 956 F. Supp. 1209 (E.D. Pa. 1997); Wright v.
Mason City Community Sch. Dist., 940 F. Supp. 1412 (N.D. Iowa 1996); Burrow
v. Postville Community Sch. Dist., 929 F. Supp. 1193 (N.D. Iowa 1996); Mennone
v. Gordon, 889 F. Supp. 53 (D. Conn. 1995); Garza v. Galena Park Indep. Sch.
Dist., 914 F. Supp. 1437 (S.D. Tex. 1994); Elliott v. New Miami Bd. of Educ., 799
F. Supp. 818 (S.D. Ohio 1992).
13. See, e.g., Verna L. Williams & Deborah L. Brake, When a Kiss Isn't Just a Kiss:
Title IX and Student-to-Student Harassment, 30 CREmHTON L. REv. 423 (1997);
Deborah Austern Colson, Safe Enough to Learn: Placing an Affirmative Duty of
Protection on Public Schools Under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, 30 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L.
REv. 169 (1995); Helena K. Dolan, The Fourth R-Respect: Combatting Peer Sex-
ual Harassment in the Public Schools, 63 FORDHAlf L. REV. 215 (1994); Elizabeth
J. Gant, Applying Title VII "Hostile Work Environment"Analysis to Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972-An Avenue of Relief for Victims of Student-to-
Student Sexual Harassment in the Schools, 98 Dic. L. REv. 489 (1994); Stacey R.
Rinestine, Terrorism on the Playground: What Can Be Done?, 32 DuQ. L. REv. 799
(1994); Gail Sorenson, Peer Sexual Harassment: Remedies and Guidelines Under
Federal Law, 92 EDUC. L. REP. 1 (1994); Karen Mellencamp Davis, Reading, Writ-
ing, and Sexual Harassment: Finding a Constitutional Remedy When Schools
Fail to Address Peer Abuse, 69 IND. L.J. 1123 (1994); Carrie N. Baker, Proposed
Title IX Guidelines on Sex-Based Harassment of Students, 43 EmoRY L.J. 271
(1994); Stefanie H. Roth, Sex Discrimination 101: Developing a Title IXAnalysis
for Sexual Harassment in Education, 23 J.L. & EDUC. 459 (1994); Adam Michael
Greenfield, Annie Get Your Gun 'Cause Help Ain't Comin' The Need for Constitu-
tional Protection from Peer Abuse in Public Schools, 43 DuKE L.J. 588 (1993);
Monica L. Sherer, No Longer Just Child's Play: School Liability Under Title IX
for Peer Sexual Harassment, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 2119 (1993); JoAnn Strauss, Peer
Sexual Harassment of High School Students: A Reasonable Student Standard
and an Affirmative Duty Imposed on Educational Institutions, 10 LAw & INEQ. J.
163 (1992); Jollee Faber, Expanding Title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972 to Prohibit Student to Student Sexual Harassment, 2 UCLA WoAmN's L.J.
85 (1992).
14. See, e.g., Tamar Lewin, Students Seeking Damages for Sex Bias, N.Y. TniEs, July
15, 1994, at B7; Deborah L. Rhode, You Must Remember This, NATL L.J., October
28, 1996, at A21; Adam Nossiter, Six-Year-Old's Sex Crime: Innocent Peck on
Cheek, N.Y. TiMEs, September 27, 1996, at A9; Judy Mann, What's Harassment?
Ask a Girl, WASH. PosT, June 23, 1993, at D26; Leora Tannenbaum, Sluts and
Suits, IN THESE TaEs, May 13, 1996, at 33; Jane Gross, Schools Our Newest
Arenas for Sex-Harassment Issues, N.Y. Tnms, March 11, 1992, at B8.
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III. PREVENTION
Those in the best position to prevent harassment are parents,
teachers, and others who are responsible for teaching school-age chil-
dren about respect. However, schools also have an important role to
play because of their obligation to provide an equal educational oppor-
tunity. Racial and sexual harassment by students should be ad-
dressed as part of a school's code of conduct, just like physical abuse
and violence. Such harassment should be taken as seriously as a
punch in the face. Most school officials will not tolerate students who
strike other students in the face; however, they are often more toler-
ant of students who harass other students. Part of this is inherent in
the nature of harassment because, unlike other types of harm, harass-
ment usually does not leave any evidence, like blood and bruises, of
the wrongful act. Therefore, when a student alleges harassment, a
dispute often occurs over whether the alleged incident actually
happened.
The difference can be demonstrated by comparing two types of
cases involving alleged discrimination in employment. Where one em-
ployee claims she was discharged because of her race or gender, usu-
ally the parties can agree to one fact-that she was discharged-and
address whether it was due to race or gender. In contrast, when an
employee claims she was racially or sexually harassed in the work-
place, the employer frequently denies the occurrence of the alleged
harassment. Because frequently no physical manifestations of the
harm caused by racial or sexual harassment exist,15 there is a ten-
dency to discount the allegation and question whether anything inap-
propriate really happened and, if so, whether real harm occurred.
Mental and emotional injuries are more difficult to detect. Nearly
everyone has experienced physical pain, and can identify with it.
15. At least, there is not an immediate physical reaction, like a bloody nose, that is
easily traceable to the blow to the nose. However, this does not mean that har-
assment does not lead to physical injuries. See, e.g., ROBERT J. SHOOP & JACK W.
HAYHOW, JR., SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN OUR SCHOOLS 64-67 (1994); MICHELE A.
PALUDI & RICHARD B. BARicKMAN, ACADEMIC AND WORKPLACE SEXUAL HARASS-
MENT 27-34 (1991); MICHELE A. PALUDI, IVORY POWER: SEXUAL HARASSMENT ON
CAMPus 78-80, 97-98 & 112-13 (1990); Julie S. Lu, Rowinsky v. Bryan Indepen-
dent School District: Does Title IX Impose Liability on Schools for Student-to-
Student Sexual Harassment?, 42 VILL. L. REV. 969 (1997); Alexandra A. Bodnar,
Arming Students for Battle: Amending Title IX to Combat the Sexual Harassment
of Students by Students in Primary and Secondary School, 5 S. CAL. REv. L. &
WOMEN'S STUD. 549, 561 (1996); Jollee Faber, Expanding Title IX of the Educa-
tion Amendments of 1972 to Prohibit Student to Student Sexual Harassment, 2
UCLA WOMEN's L.J. 85, 97 (1992).
Aside from physical injuries, there is often an immediate psychological reac-
tion. See, e.g., Murrell v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, CO, 186 F.3d 1238, 1244
(10th Cir. 1999) (stating that victim began to engage in self-destructive and sui-
cidal behavior).
[Vol. 79:1
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However, many people have not experienced discrimination or harass-
ment and have not made an effort to understand the mental, emo-
tional, and physical harm it can cause. This is evident when people
suggest that no clear line exists between "teasing" and actionable har-
assment. Such an attitude can easily lead school officials to question
the need for preemptive policies and to be cavalier in their treatment
of harassment complaints made by victims.
Nevertheless, school officials have at least three incentives for
adopting a meaningful policy prohibiting racial and sexual harass-
ment. First, they should be interested in promoting respect (the
fourth R)16 for fellow students. This can be accomplished through pos-
itive steps as well as a policy against behavior that shows a lack of
respect. Second, school officials have an affirmative duty to provide
an equal educational opportunity by removing any barriers based on
race or gender. Third, schools should be interested in avoiding litiga-
tion and liability arising out of peer harassment. By analogy to cases
involving sexual harassment that creates a hostile work environ-
ment,' 7 the existence of a policy may be a factor in determining
whether the school corporation is liable. The latter possibly provides
the most powerful incentive because it more easily and directly trans-
lates into financial terms. Whatever the motivation, no school should
be without a comprehensive policy related to racial and sexual harass-
ment of students by students, as well as by teachers and other school
employees.
Any such policy should appear in a prominent place in the student
handbook and address all peer harassment even though certain types
of harassment may not lead to legal liability, at least not under civil
rights laws.1 S While the policy uses the term "harassment," it could
16. See Helena K. Dolan, The Fourth R-Respect: Combatting Peer Sexual Harass-
ment in the Public Schools, 63 FoRDHAAi L. REv. 215 (1994).
17. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2268-70
(1998)(citing sexual harassment in employment by supervisors); see also Farley v.
American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 115 F.3d 1548, 1554-55 (11th Cir. 1997)(discussing
company's liability for harassment by co-workers); Bonenberger v. Plymouth
Transp., 132 F.3d 20, 26-27 (3d Cir. 1997)(analyzing liability for harassment by
co-workers); Harris v. L&L Wings, Inc., 132 F.3d 978, 982 (4th Cir. 1997)(discuss-
ing liability for harassment by co-workers).
18. While any harassment in school can interfere with an education, only those char-
acteristics covered by federal law-i.e. race, national origin, sex, or disability-
are actionable under the federal civil rights laws. All forms of harassment may
be actionable under state law. Another advantage of addressing all peer harass-
ment in a school policy is that it helps avoid the "underinclusive" argument relied
upon by the majority inR.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). In that case a St.
Paul ordinance regulating "hate speech" was found unconstitutional because it
addressed only "fighting words" directed at someone because of their race, color,
creed, religion or gender. St. Paul, 505 U.S. at 384. Therefore, a more general
policy is less susceptible to a First Amendment challenge.
20001
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be defined as "interference"1 9 because, in the context of education, the
real evil of harassment lies in its interference with an equal educa-
tional opportunity.
The following represents the basic structure of a policy that, with
changes in the language to reflect the ages of the students, may be
appropriate for elementary and secondary schools.
It is the policy of the school to promote respect for students, teachers, ad-
ministrators and staff. Further, it is the goal of the school to provide an envi-
ronment conducive to learning in which all students have an equal
opportunity to learn and develop. Student harassment of other students
shows a lack of respect and interferes with the opportunity to learn and de-
velop. Therefore, harassment of other students will not be tolerated and, if
proved, will lead to disciplinary action.
In order for school officials to deal with those students who harass other
students, it is important that the targets or victims of such harassment report
it promptly. Also, students who observe harassment directed at others should
report it. If anyone treats you differently because you reported harassment or
cooperated in an investigation of harassment, please report the different
treatment so we can protect you. Such retaliatory action constitutes a sepa-
rate violation of the code of conduct and may lead to separate disciplinary
action.
Any school employee who observes, or otherwise becomes aware of, harass-
ment of students, must report it promptly to
Harassment is defined as any conduct that is sufficiently severe, pervasive
or persistent to interfere with or limit the ability of a student to participate in
or benefit from school programs, services and activities. Such harassing con-
duct may be physical, verbal, graphic or written.
If you believe you are a victim of harassment by other students, or have
reason to believe another student is being harassed, you should report this to
the Office of the Principal, a teacher, a counselor, a school nurse, your par-
ents, or [alternatives, such as designated students]. Alter you report the infor-
mation, an investigation will be undertaken promptly and, if there is reason to
believe harassment took place, corrective or remedial action will be taken and
disciplinary proceedings will be initiated in accordance with §__
The person(s) designated to accept charges of harassment should
be trained so the victim is not made to feel like the wrongdoer. 20 A
19. This is based, in part, on a provision in the Fair Housing Act which states:
[it is] unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any per-
son in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his having exercised
or enjoyed, or on account of his having aided or encouraged any other
person in the exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted or protected by
[other provisions of the Act].
42 U.S.C. § 3617 (1983). Similarly, the Americans with Disabilities Act states:
[it is] unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any indi-
vidual in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his or her having
exercised or enjoyed, or on account of his or her having aided or en-
couraged any other individual in the exercise or enjoyment of, any right
granted or protected by this Act.
42 U.S.C. § 12203(b) (1997).
20. The AAUW Survey, supra note 5, at 14, indicates that harassment in school is
underreported, at least to school officials. Victims "do not routinely report sexual
harassment incidents to adults," and only "7% of sexually harassed students say
[Vol. 79:1
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referral to the school counselor may be required, depending on how
traumatic the incident was to the victim.2 ' A determination of
whether the reported conduct constitutes harassment should be re-
served until the investigation is completed. The worst response by
any school official notified of student harassment would be one that
suggests the matter is not taken seriously by school officials. This
message can be communicated in a number of ways, including the fail-
ure to do anything, a suggestion that such behavior is acceptable
("boys will be boys"), a suggestion that the complaining party must
have invited the action, or a suggestion that the victim should be able
to deal with the conduct. 22 A comparison to the student complaining
of a punch in the face is appropriate because it is unlikely a school
official will send the message that such physical abuse is not taken
seriously.
In adopting policies, taking preventative measures, and imposing
discipline for harassment, public schools must be aware of potential
First and Fourteenth Amendment issues.23 Because harassment can
they have told a teacher about the experience, with girls twice as likely as boys to
have done this." Id. Students are far more likely to report harassment to a
friend, with the study showing that 63% of the victims told a friend. See id. A 16-
year-old white female is quoted as saying, "I wasn't dressed very provocative and
I gave them no reason to harass me. I was upset the administration didn't re-
spond immediately after I complained. I was told to ignore the harassers." Id.
In its guidance on sexual harassment, the Office of Civil Rights (OCR) says:
[tiraining for administrators, teachers, and staff and age-appropriate
classroom information for students can help to ensure that they under-
stand what types of conduct can cause sexual harassment and that they
know how to respond.... Finally, the school must make sure that all
designated employees have adequate training as to what conduct consti-
tutes sexual harassment and are able to explain how the grievance pro-
cedure operates.
Sexual Harassment Guidance, supra note 4, at 12,044, 12,045 (1997). The OCR
found that a college violated Title IX "in part because the person identified by the
school as the Title IX coordinator was unfamiliar with Title IX, had no training,
and did not even realize he was the coordinator." Id. at 12,051 n.91.
21. See, e.g., Sexual Harassment Guidance, supra note 4, at 12,045 (stating that the
victim of harassment cannot be expected to work out the problem directly with
the alleged harassers without appropriate involvement by school officials like
counselors, trained mediators, teachers, or administrators).
22. After she complained to the Superintendent and Title IX compliance officer, in
Niles v. Nelson, 72 F. Supp. 2d 13, 15 (N.D.N.Y. 1999), the student-victim was
suspended for "making a false report" and the suspension was upheld by the
Board of Education. See also Murrell v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, CO, 186 F.3d
1238, 1244 (10th Cir. 1999)(noting that the victim, a developmentally and physi-
cally disabled high school student, was suspended by the principal for "[blehavior
which is detrimental to the welfare, safety, or morals of other pupils or school
personnel," after the principal suggested the sexual contact may have been con-
sensual even though the boy admitted assaulting the victim after she resisted his
advances).
23. The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees freedom of speech and
expressive association. While the First Amendment refers only to Congress, it
20001
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sometimes qualify as an expression of one's opposition to racial and/or
gender equality, efforts to suppress such expression may be chal-
lenged as a violation of the right to freedom of speech guaranteed by
the First Amendment. While not intended as an exhaustive discus-
sion of the First Amendment issue, the following provides at least an
introduction to the arguments.
Much has been written about harassing speech, sometimes re-
ferred to as "hate speech."24 A student disciplined for harassing an-
other student may challenge the school policy or its application as a
content-based restriction of speech - because it regulates a particular
subject matter - or a viewpoint-based restriction, because it estab-
lishes an acceptable view of racial or gender equality.2 5 Normally
courts subject such a restriction on speech to strict scrutiny, which
requires the government to show (1) a compelling interest or purpose
served by the restrictions, and (2) that the regulation is narrowly tai-
lored to achieve that governmental interest or purpose. 26 Strict scru-
tiny is frequently, but not always, fatal to any restriction of speech.2 7
applies to state and local government through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment also provides procedural protection to those who are dis-
ciplined by public schools.
Because of the state action requirement, neither the First Amendment nor the
Fourteenth Amendment applies to private schools; however, the values reflected
in these amendments-free exchange of ideas and fairness-should be taught in
private schools as well, and there is no better way to teach such values than
through example.
24. See, e.g., Steven H. Shiffrin, Racist Speech, Outsider Jurisprudence, and the
Meaning of America, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 43 (1994); Richard Delgado & Jean
Stefancic, Hateful Speech, Loving Communities: Why Our Notion of "A Just Bal-
ance" Changes so Slowly, 82 CAL. L. REV. 851 (1994); Charles R. Lawrence, If He
Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUICE L.J. 431
(1990); Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Vic-
tim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989).
25. A regulation of speech is content-based ifit regulates discussion of a certain topic,
such as racial or sexual equality. A regulation is viewpoint-based if it prohibits
dissemination of anti-equality sentiments while allowing pro-equality expression.
The latter type of regulation is more offensive to First Amendment principles
because it represents a governmental determination of the accepted view on a
particular subject.
26. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989)(holding a Texas statute regulat-
ing flag burning unconstitutional).
27. See, e.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988) (stating that an ordinance prohib-
iting focused was picketing justified by the government's interest in protecting
the well-being, tranquility and privacy of the home); Roberts v. United States
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984)(holding that the government interest in gender
equality trumps the First Amendment interest in expressive association);
Chaplinksy v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (holding that the government
interest in preserving the peace and protecting individuals from harm trumps the
First Amendment interest in uttering "fighting words").
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The governmental interest in a policy prohibiting racial and sexual
harassment in public schools is to assure equal educational opportuni-
ties for all students, regardless of race or gender, and to avoid injury
to students. In another context, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized in
Roberts v. United States Jaycees that a state's interest in eradicating
discrimination against females was compelling. 28 Roberts addressed a
First Amendment challenge, based on the right to expressive associa-
tion, to Minnesota's Human Rights Act, which prohibited sex discrimi-
nation in places of public accommodation, as applied to membership
organizations such as the Jaycees. The state determined that sex dis-
crimination by such organizations imposes barriers to female eco-
nomic advancement and political and social integration. 29 Certainly
barriers to an equal educational opportunity are as harmful as barri-
ers to such public accommodations. Therefore, a public school should
be able to survive the first prong of the strict scrutiny standard. 30
A regulation restricting only speech or symbolic expression that in-
terferes with an equal educational opportunity is the least restrictive
means of accomplishing the compelling government interest identified
above.31 Thus, the regulation should be general, in the sense that it
reach all harassment that interferes with an equal educational oppor-
tunity, so it is not subject to an argument that it is viewpoint-based
and underinclusive. 3 2 At the same time, the regulation should care-
fully define harassment so students are on notice of what constitutes
prohibited activity and the regulation avoids a vagueness attack.3 3
28. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
29. See id. at 626.
30. The government's interest in preserving equality in housing is sufficiently com-
pelling to justify the restrictions on freedom of expression found in 42 U.S.C.
§ 3617, which prohibits the interference with one's enjoyment of housing through
such expressive activity as a cross burning in front of a home. See, e.g., United
States v. J.H.H., 22 F.3d 821, 826-28 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Hayward, 6
F.3d 1241, 1249-51 (7th Cir. 1993).
31. The "narrowly tailored" requirement assures that the means utilized to accom-
plish the compelling governmental objective regulate no more speech than is nec-
essary to accomplish the objective. Even where there is a compelling
governmental interest, a regulation will be struck down if it is not narrowly tai-
lored. See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of New York State Crime
Victims Board, 502 U.S. 105 (1991).
32. See R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
33. "A law is unconstitutionally vague if a reasonable person cannot tell what speech
is prohibited and what is permitted." CHEAMRPRSKY, CoNsTITTIoNAL LAW PRIN-
CIPLES AND PoLrrcs 763 (1997). See, e.g., Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357
(1983) ("[The void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the
criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand
what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary
and discriminatory enforcement").
A related concept is overbreadth. "A law is unconstitutionally overbroad if it
regulates substantially more speech than the Constitution allows to be regulated
and a person to whom the law constitutionally can be applied can argue that it
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In defending a First Amendment attack on a regulation prohibiting
harassment, schools might suggest a forum approach that takes into
account the role of government as an educator.3 4 As a general matter,
a public building does not automatically qualify as a public forum.
The use of government-owned property may be restricted to preserve
it for its intended purpose. 35 For example, while a trial is in session,
limitations can be placed on speech in the courtroom; while a class is
in session, limitations can be placed on speech in the classroom. If a
school is a non-public forum, then reasonable restrictions on speech
will be upheld as long as they are not based on viewpoint. 36 This ap-
proach gives greater deference to school officials and makes it much
more likely that a regulation prohibiting harassment will be upheld.
While it does not prevent school officials from addressing peer har-
assment of students, the First Amendment must be considered care-
fully when preparing a regulation designed to address harassment.37
Private schools, even though not bound by the First Amendment,
should promote the values embodied in the First Amendment because
of the importance of a free exchange of ideas in an educational setting.
With careful drafting and sensitivity to the competing concerns,
schools should be able to address harassment problems without violat-
ing the First Amendment.
A second constitutional issue affects public schools' approach to
regulating harassment. In attempting to address peer harassment,
public schools must not ignore the requirements of the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 38
would be unconstitutional as applied to others." CHEmERINSKY, at 764-65. See,
e.g., Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
34. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983)(uphold-
ing statute which restricted access to both the inter-school mail system and
teacher mailboxes); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972)(upholding
an ordinance barring a demonstration near a school); see generally Sexual Har-
assment Guidance, supra note 4, at 12,045-46.
The role of government as an educator has been recognized by the Court. See,
e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); Bethel Sch. Dist.
No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
35. See, e.g., United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1990)(upholding a prohibition
on the solicitation of contributions on postal premises); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S.
828 (1976)(upholding regulations barring political activities on a military base).
36. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992);
Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
37. See Sexual Harassment Guidance, supra note 4, at 12,045-46; see also Monteiro v.
Tempe Union High Sch. Dist., 158 F.3d 1022, 1026-32 (9th Cir. 1998)(expressing
first amendment concerns if the plaintiffs challenge to a required reading was
successful); Saxe v. State College Area School Dist., 77 F. Supp. 2d 621 (M.D. Pa.
1999)(holding that a school policy is not a hate-speech code, but rather a prohibi-
tion of harassment, which has never been considered to be protected under the
First Amendment).
38. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
prohibits deprivations of life, liberty or property without due process. In Goss v.
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Those students accused of harassing other students are entitled to
procedural safeguards before being "convicted" of harassment. At a
minimum, they should receive sufficient notice of the charges to en-
able them to prepare a defense and they should be given an opportu-
nity to be heard before an impartial tribunal, just like the process
available to the student accused of striking another student.39 Pre-
sumably most schools already have disciplinary procedures in place
and those procedures should be adequate to address charges of har-
assment. While peer harassment must be taken seriously, efforts to
prevent it and address complaints of harassment must not ignore the
constitutional rights of those accused of harassment.
IV. REMEDIES FOR VICTIMS
Where efforts at prevention are unsuccessful, parents and students
may consider litigation and, for obvious reasons, they would prefer to
litigate against schools and their officials rather than, or at least in
addition to, the students engaged in harassment. Because the poten-
tial causes of action and remedies will differ depending on the type of
school and nature of the harassment, this article will examine both
public and private schools, as well as racial and sexual harassment
within each type of school separately. Potential actions based on com-
mon law will be considered briefly in a separate section.40
A. Public Schools-Federal Claims
1. Racial Harassment
There are several federal laws, starting with the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 41 that prohibit race discrimi-
nation in public schools. The Supreme Court's seminal decision in
Brown v. Board of Education42 made it clear that a public school
would violate the equal protection clause, as well as federal statutes,43
if it excluded or subjected a student to different terms and conditions
because of her race. Similarly, racial harassment directed at a stu-
Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), the Court held that students suspended from public
high schools for up to ten days were entitled to procedural protection against
unfair suspensions. Because the students had a protected interest in educational
benefits, they were entitled to notice of the charges against them and, if they
denied them, an explanation of the evidence as well as an opportunity to present
their side of the story.
39. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
40. See infra section IV.C.
41. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that
"[nio State shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec-
tion of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
42. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
43. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 2000d (1994).
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dent by a school administrator or teacher would clearly violate the
law. Peer harassment based on race, although it can deprive a stu-
dent of an education, is more difficult to remedy because school offi-
cials are not directly responsible for the injury. Nevertheless, school
officials have a duty to assure that all students have an equal opportu-
nity to learn, regardless of race. Thus, the question is whether public
schools and their officials can be held liable when students are de-
prived of an equal educational opportunity by other students because
of their race.
a. Fourteenth Amendment-Equal Protection
When a state or local government official engages in intentional,44
invidious discrimination45 based on race, a violation of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment occurs unless a compel-
ling justification exists for such discrimination.46 Rarely, if ever, will
government have a compelling justification for invidious race discrimi-
nation.4 7 Therefore, if plaintiffs show that public officials are respon-
sible for intentional, invidious race discrimination, plaintiffs should
win. However, even assuming that the actions of the harassing stu-
dents are directed at the student victims because of their race, the
crucial question is when should the schools and school officials be le-
gally responsible and liable, absent intentional, invidious discrimina-
tion by school officials. The answer may vary depending on the
circumstances.
A number of situations will help to demonstrate the issues:
(1) A school principal expressly requests or encourages a group of
students to harass, threaten and intimidate another group of stu-
dents, based on the race of the latter group;
44. In Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), the Court held there must be proof
of a discriminatory purpose in order to show a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause. A year later, in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), the Court discussed the different ways in which a
discriminatory purpose could be shown.
45. The term "invidious" is used here to distinguish the discrimination discussed
here from racial classifications benefitting minorities.
46. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995); Richmond v.
J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984);
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
47. In Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984), the Court stated that "[c]lassifying
persons according to their race is more likely to reflect racial prejudice than legit-
imate public concerns." Ironically, the strict scrutiny standard for race discrimi-
nation was first articulated by the Court in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214 (1944), the case in which the Court upheld the constitutionality of the reloca-
tion of Japanese-Americans during World War II. The outcome is probably ex-
plained by the Court's deference to the military, especially in times of war, and
represents a rare example of invidious race discrimination surviving strict
scrutiny.
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(2) School officials, in a school without a policy addressing harass-
ment, do not actively request or encourage students to harass,
threaten and intimidate other students based on race, but give the
students a "license" to engage in such activity through the officials'
own discriminatory actions and attitudes, which in some cases speak
more clearly and loudly than express encouragement, and their failure
to address or take seriously complaints of such activity;
(3) School officials, in a school with a policy addressing harass-
ment, while not engaged in discriminatory actions affirmatively, fail
to take complaints of harassment seriously and routinely fail to inves-
tigate such complaints or, even worse, find a reason to discipline the
victims, but not the perpetrators; and
(4) School officials, pursuant to a policy prohibiting peer harass-
ment and establishing a procedure for submitting complaints,
promptly investigate the complaints, make findings and then take ap-
propriate disciplinary action against the perpetrators found in viola-
tion of the policy and also attempt to remedy the situation for the
victim(s). 48
Obviously the school, along with its officials, is most likely to be
held liable in the first situation and least likely to be held liable in the
fourth situation. The liability of the school and its principal in the
first example should be no different than if the principal himself had
engaged in the racially motivated harassment. As a general matter, a
government official cannot avoid liability for illegal discrimination by
having someone else carry out the discriminatory activity.49
The three remaining examples present more difficult situations be-
cause the causal connection between the injury to the victims and the
school officials is less obvious. In the second example, school officials
are aware from the complaints that the victims of harassment are be-
48. In addition to dealing with the perpetrators and ending the harassment, adminis-
trative remedies might include counseling for the victims and compensatory
education.
49. Where there is 'joint participation" between government officials and private per-
sons, both can be held liable under constitutional and statutory provisions requir-
ing action under color of law. See, e.g., Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922
(1982); Sullivan v. Barnett, 139 F.3d 158, 168-70 (3d Cir. 1998); Davila-Lopes v.
Zapata, 111 F.3d 192, 193 (1st Cir. 1997); Catanzano v. Wing, 103 F.3d 223, 228-
29 (2d Cir. 1996); Leeks v. Cunningham, 997 F.2d 1330, 1333 n.3 (l1th Cir.
1993); Phelps v. Dunn, 965 F.2d 93, 102 (6th Cir. 1992); Apostol v. Landau, 957
F.2d 339, 343 (7th Cir. 1992).
Supervisors can be held liable for the actions of subordinates when there is an
affirmative link between the challenged conduct and the action or inaction of the
supervisor. See, e.g., Oona, R.-S.- by Kate S. v. McCaffrey, 143 F.3d at 477; Spen-
cer v. Doe, 139 F.3d 107, 112 (2d Cir. 1998); Springdale Educ. Ass'n v. Springdale
Sch. Dist., 133 F.3d 649, 653 (8th Cir. 1998); Kaul v. Stephan, 83 F.3d 1208, 1213
n.3 (10th Cir. 1996); John Doe v. Hillsboro Indep. Sch. Dist., 81 F.3d 1395, 1402-
03 (5th Cir. 1996).
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ing deprived of equal educational opportunities because of their race,
but they allow the deprivation to continue. Such officials, through
both their encouragement and their inaction, have engaged in inten-
tional discrimination based on race by depriving the victims of equal
educational opportunities. A clear causal connection exists between
the action/inaction of the school officials and the injury to the victims.
Here the school officials' conduct constitutes the equivalent of that of
law enforcement officials who, upon observing an African-American
being beaten, decide to walk away without intervening because of the
victim's race, thus depriving the victim of equal protection of the law
enforcement agency.5 0 Also, it resembles the employer that does noth-
ing after learning that, for example, a customer of the employer is
harassing one of its employees.51
The third example closely resembles the second, except the school
has a formal policy. However, because school officials ignore the for-
mal policy in practice, the situation differs little from the second. The
same evil occurs: school officials are aware that students are being
deprived of an equal educational opportunity because of race, but do
nothing about it. Instead, they continue to operate a system that de-
prives students of equal opportunities because of their race. Such sys-
temic, intentional race discrimination violates equal protection. 52
In the fourth example, any liability imposed on the school or the
school officials may appear to be in the nature of strict liability be-
cause there is no obvious indication of fault or causation. Here the
argument against liability is strongest because the school adopted a
policy prohibiting harassment and, as soon as school officials were
50. Law enforcement officers have an affirmative duty to intervene to protect the
constitutional rights of citizens from infringement by other officers. See, e.g., Ric-
ciuti v. NYC Transit Authority, 124 F.3d 123, 129 (2d Cir. 1997); Turner v. Scott,
119 F.3d 425, 429-30 (6th Cir. 1997); Frazell v. Flanigan, 102 F.3d 877, 885-86
(7th Cir. 1996); Mick v. Brewer, 76 F.3d 1127, 1136 (10th Cir. 1996); Hale v.
Townley, 45 F.3d 914, 919 (5th Cir. 1995); Yang v. Hardin, 37 F.3d 282, 285 (7th
Cir. 1994); United States v. Koon, 34 F.3d 1416, 1446-49 (9th Cir. 1994) rev'd on
other grounds, 116 S. Ct. 2035 (1996).
51. See, e.g., Lockard v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 162 F.3d 1062, 1072-75 (10th Cir. 1998);
Rodriguez-Hernandez v. Miranda-Velez, 132 F.3d 848, 854-55 (1st Cir. 1998);
Crist v. Focus Homes, Inc., 122 F.3d 1107, 1111-12 (8th Cir. 1997); Folkerson v.
Circus Circus Enterprises, Inc., 107 F.3d 754, 756 (9th Cir. 1997).
In a case alleging racial harassment by elementary school students and claim-
ing a violation of equal protection and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, the court held that school
districts and school officials may be held liable upon a showing of deliberate indif-
ference to the harassment and such indifference can be shown from school offi-
cials' actions or inaction in light of known circumstances. However, summary
judgment for the defendants was appropriate because the record did not include
sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find deliberate indifference. See Gant
ex rel Gant v. Wallingford Bd. of Educ., 195 F.3d 134 (2nd Cir. 1999).
52. See, e.g., Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189 (1973); Green v.
County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
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made aware of harassment, they took appropriate action to address
the harassment. However, prompt corrective action does not elimi-
nate the injury suffered by the victim. For example, assume the har-
assment was so traumatic that it caused serious health problems for
the victim. Because schools have "a duty to provide a nondiscrimina-
tory environment that is conducive to learning," the victim in this ex-
ample may still be entitled to compensation for her injury. Similarly,
if a school has a duty to protect students from harm caused by a third
party, prompt corrective action will not eliminate liability for inju-
ries.53 One way to "reward" the school for adopting a policy and tak-
ing prompt corrective action would be to provide an affirmative
defense if it could show that in fact all reasonable steps were taken to
prevent the harassment.5 4 If the school successfully establishes the
affirmative defense, the injured victim could still seek compensation
from the students who caused the harm.
Actions to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment are generally filed
-pursuant to a Reconstruction Era civil rights statute (42 U.S.C.
§ 1983),55 under which both individuals and municipalities can be
held liable. However, entities can be liable under section 1983 only
when the challenged conduct was taken pursuant to municipal pol-
icy.5 6 The policy does not have to be explicit.5 7 Officials who have
53. See infra notes 193 and 234-38 and accompanying text. In Oona R.S. ex rel Kate
S. v. McCaffrey, 143 F.3d 473, 477 (9th Cir. 1998), the court held "the duty to take
reasonable steps to remedy a known hostile environment created by a peer is
clearly established. Parents have long had a right to expect school officials to do
what they reasonably can to protect the children who are temporarily in their
custody and to provide an appropriate learning atmosphere." Id.
54. Such a defense would be analogous to that created for employers in Burlington
Indus., Inc. v. Elerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998). In Burlington Indus. the Court
held:
An employer is subject to vicarious liability to a victimized employee for
an actionable hostile environment created by a supervisor with immedi-
ate (or successively higher) authority over the employee. When no tangi-
ble employment action is taken, a defending employer may raise an
affirmative defense to liability or damages, subject to proof by a prepon-
derance of the evidence, see FED. R. CIv. P. 8(c). The defense comprises
two necessary elements: (a) that the employer exercised reasonable care
to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b)
that the plaintiff-employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any
preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to
avoid harm otherwise.
55. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
56. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978); see generally IVAN E.
BODENSTEINER & RosAIE BERGER LEVINSON, STATE & LocAL GoVERmIENT CIVnL
RIGHTS LIABILruY §§ 1:06-07 (1987) [hereinafter CIVIL RIGHTS LIABILITY].
57. See, e.g., City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989) (stating that a municipal-
ity may be held liable for a failure to train or supervise where that failure consti-
tutes a deliberate indifference to the rights of persons who come into contact with
its employees, and there is a causal connection between the injury and the munic-
ipality's failure); see generally CIVIL RIGHTs LIABILITY, supra note 56, at § 1:07.
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been delegated policymaking authority can bind the municipality by
their conduct.5 8 Thus, for example, the school official to whom the
municipality delegates the responsibility for maintaining discipline
and operating a school would generally be a person whose conduct is
considered a "policy" for purposes of binding the school corporation.59
Therefore, victims of racial harassment must make high-ranking
school officials - including board members, the superintendent, the
principal, or the persons identified in the school harassment policy -
aware of the harassment. Such notice to school officials should be
written, to reduce disputes about whether and when such officials re-
ally had notice. Even where the challenged action is not that of a poli-
cymaker, where a school corporation shows deliberate indifference to
the rights of the students-by its failure to train employees, to disci-
pline those who ignore their duties or to correct a denial of equal edu-
cational opportunity-and that indifference is the cause of the victims'
injury, the school corporation can be held liable under section 1983.60
If a victim of peer harassment establishes liability under the equal
protection clause and section 1983, she can obtain compensatory dam-
ages,6 1 equitable relief,6 2 costs, and attorney fees.63 In addition, if a
student proves that school officials acted in reckless disregard of her
federally protected rights, the jury may award punitive damages, at
58. See, e.g., CIVIL RIGHTS LIABILITY, supra note 56, at § 1:06; Pembaur v. City of
Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986). It is important to consult state law to determine
whether a particular policymaker has in fact been delegated final decisionmaking
authority.
59. Identifying this school official will require a close review of state law. See, e.g.,
Duda v. Franklin Park Pub. Sch. Dist. 84, 133 F.3d 1054, 1061 (7th Cir. 1998);
Springdale Educ. Ass'n v. Springdale Sch. Dist., 133 F.3d 649, 652 (8th Cir.
1998); Eugene v. Alief Indep. Sch. Dist., 65 F.3d 1299, 1304-05 (5th Cir. 1995);
Baxter ex rel Baxter v. Vigo County Sch. Corp., 26 F.3d 728, 735-36 (7th Cir.
1994); Cornfield by Lewis v. Consolidated High Sch. Dist. No. 230, 991 F.2d 1316,
1325 (7th Cir. 1993); Adkins v. Board of Educ., 982 F.2d 952, 958-59 (6th Cir.
1993); Partee v. Metropolitan Sch. Dist., 954 F.2d 454, 456 (7th Cir. 1992); Hull v.
Cuyahoga Valley Bd. of Educ., 926 F.2d 505, 515-16 (6th Cir. 1991).
60. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989). Several cases recognize that
Harris applies in the school setting, but demonstrate the difficulty of proof. See,
e.g., Doe v. Hillsboro Indep. Sch. Dist. 113 F.3d 1412, 1416 (5th Cir. 1997); Kin-
man v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 94 F.3d 463, 467 (8th Cir. 1996); Thelma D. ex rel
Delores A. v. Board of Educ., 934 F.2d 929, 934-35 (8th Cir. 1991).
61. See Memphis Community Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299 (1986); Carey v.
Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978); see generally CIVIL RIGHTS LIABILITY, supra note 56,
at § 1:47.
62. The statute [42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994)] specifically provides the injured party with
a "suit in equity." See generally CIVIL RIGHTS LIABILITY, supra note 56, at § 1:53.
63. A 1976 amendment to the civil rights statutes provides that the court "may allow
the prevailing party . . .a reasonable attorney's fee as a part of the cost." 42
U.S.C. § 1988 (1994). See generally CIVIL RIGHTS LIABILITY, supra note 56, at
§§ 1:57 - 1:64.
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least against the officials in their individual capacity.6 4 While school
officials can raise qualified immunity from damages as an affirmative
defense,6 5 this should fail in most cases because intentional discrimi-
nation based on race is clearly unconstitutional.
b. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
This statute6 6 generally prohibits race discrimination by recipients
of federal financial assistance. Many elementary and secondary pub-
lic schools, as well as many private schools, receive such assistance.
67
The DOE, through the OCR, has the authority and obligation to en-
force Title VI in relation to educational institutions.68 Victims can file
discrimination complaints with the OCR69 and, if it finds a violation,
it can attempt conciliation7 0 and ultimately initiate proceedings to
64. See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983); see generally CIIL RiGHTS LABmIITY,
supra note 56, at § 1:50. Generally, municipalities are not liable for punitive
damages. See City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981).
65. Government officials have available a qualified immunity from damages awarded
against them in their individual capacity where the right relied upon by the
plaintiff was not "clearly established" at the time of the challenged conduct.
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); see generally CIWIL RIGHTS LABiL-
rry, supra note 56, at § 1:40-1:41.
66. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994). The specific prohibition on discrimination reads as fol-
lows: "No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or na-
tional origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal fi-
nancial assistance." Id.
67. In its "Budget Homepage," the United States Department of Education states:
The anti-poverty and civil rights laws of the 1960s and 1970s brought
about a dramatic emergence of the Department's equal access mission.
The passage of [Title VI, Title IX and § 504] which prohibited discrimi-
nation based on race, sex, and disability, respectively, made civil rights
enforcement a fundamental and long-lasting focus of the Department of
Education. In 1965, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act
launched a comprehensive set of programs, including the Title I program
of Federal aid to disadvantaged children to address the problems of poor
urban and rural areas. And in that same year, the Higher Education Act
authorized assistance for postsecondary education, including financial
aid programs for needy college students.
In 1980, Congress established the Department of Education as a Cab-
inet level agency. Today, ED operates some 175 programs that touch on
every area and level of education. The Department's elementary and
secondary programs annually serve 15,000 school districts and more
than 50 million students attending over 85,000 public schools and more
than 26,000 private schools. Department programs also provide grant,
loan, and work-study assistance to nearly 8 million postsecondary
students.
The Federal Role in Education (visited April 7, 1999) <http:J/www.ed.gov/offices/
OUS/fedrole.html>.
68. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1994); 34 C.F.R. § 100.1-100.13 (1999).
69. See 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(b)(1999).
70. See 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(d)(1999).
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terminate the federal funds.71 If a victim of discrimination considers
litigation, they are not required to exhaust this administrative
remedy.72
A private right of action exists to enforce Title VI in court 73 and the
implementing regulations adopted by the DOE are entitled to defer-
ence in interpreting the statute.74 At least some Supreme Court jus-
tices believe DOE regulations themselves may be enforced against
public schools through section 1983.75 The scope of the protection pro-
vided by Title VI is generally the same as the protection provided by
the equal protection clause, requiring the plaintiff to prove intentional
discrimination. 76 However, neutral practices with a disparate impact
can be addressed if a Title VI regulation that reaches disparate impact
applies. 77 In most situations it is not necessary to rely on disparate
impact because a school's failure to protect students from racial har-
assment by other students is intentional. Assuming this is correct,
then in most cases against public schools the relief available under
Title VI will be similar to the relief available under section 1983 in an
action to enforce the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. However, there are some potentially significant differ-
ences, depending on the situation.
First, the relief available under section 1983 may be better for
plaintiffs because it provides for both compensatory and punitive dam-
71. See 34 C.F.R. § 100.8 (1999).
72. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 706-08 n.41 (1979) (stating in
dicta that exhaustion of administrative remedies was not necessary under Title
IX); Neighborhood Action Coalition v. Canton, 882 F.2d 1012, 1015 (6th Cir.
1989)(relying on Cannon, the court held that Title VI plaintiffs do not have to
exhaust administrative remedies); Doe v. St. Joseph's Hospital, 788 F.2d 411, 426
(7th Cir. 1986)(stating that there is no need to exhaust administrative remedies
under Title VI); see generally CIVIL RIGHTs LIABILITY, supra note 56, at § 8:36.
73. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979); CIVIL RiHTs LiABn-
rrY, supra note 56, at § 8:32.
74. See Monteiro v. Tempe Union High Sch. Dist., 158 F.3d 1022, 1033 (9th Cir.
1998).
75. See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 607 n.27 (1983).
76. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 284-87 & 325 (1978).
While five justices agreed to this in Bakke, four justices suggested it may be lim-
ited to affirmative action cases. Id. at 325.
77. See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 607 n. 27 (1983). For
example,
recipients, in determining the types of services, financial aid, or other
benefits, or facilities that will be provided under any such program...
may not.., utilize criteria or methods of administration which have the
effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination because of their race,
... or have the effect of defeating or substantially impairing accomplish-
ment of the objectives of the program as respect individuals of a particu-
lar race....
34 C.F.R. § 100.3(b)(2)(1999).
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ages, while punitive damages are questionable under Title VI.78 Sec-
ond, it may be easier to hold the school corporation liable under Title
VI because of the need to show a "policy" under section 1983.79 Third,
some courts limit liability for violations of Title VI to the recipient of
federal financial assistance, usually an entity such as a school corpo-
ration.8 0 Based on these rulings, individual school officials cannot be
held liable under Title VI, although it is not clear why Title VI should
be interpreted in such a limited manner, particularly where a school
employee or official intentionally violates the prohibition against race
discrimination. 8 Fourth, where the local school is an agency of the
state, rather than an independent local entity, it may be insulated
78. In Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 68-71 (1992), the Court
confirmed the long-standing general rule that, absent clear direction to the con-
trary by Congress, where there is a cause of action under a federal statute the
federal courts have the power to award any appropriate relief. Although the
plaintiffs claim in Franklin was based on Title IX, the rationale applies to Title
VI as well. Despite the broad language in Franklin, some lower courts have been
reluctant to allow punitive damages in claims based on the federal funding stat-
utes, such as Title VI. See, e.g., Moreno v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 99 F.3d 782,
788-92 (6th Cir. 1996)(punitive damages not available under § 504); Doe v.
Londonderry Sch. Dist., 970 F. Supp. 64, 76 (D.N.H. 1997)(punitive damages are
not available against municipalities, including public school districts, under Title
IX); Collier ex rel Collier v. William Penn Sch. Dist., 956 F. Supp. 1209, 1217
(E.D. Pa. 1997) (same). But see, e.g., Pandazides v. Virginia Bd. of Educ., 13 F.3d
823, 829-32 (4th Cir. 1994)(punitive damages available under § 504); Doe v. Oys-
ter River Cooperative Sch. Dist., 992 F. Supp. 467, 482 (D.N.H. 1997)(punitive
damages available to private litigants under Title IX); Hernandez v. City of Hart-
ford, 959 F. Supp. 125, 133-34 (D. Conn. 1997)(punitive damages available under
§ 504); Kilroy v. Husson College, 959 F. Supp. 22, 24-25 (D. Me. 1997) (same);
DeLeo v. City of Stamford, 919 F. Supp. 70, 72-74 (D. Conn 1995)(same).
79. See discussion of the section 1983 "policy" requirement, supra notes 56- 60 and
accompanying text. While cases generally hold that the federal funding statutes
impose liability on the recipient of the federal financial assistance, the circum-
stances under which a school corporation can be held liable under Title IX for the
actions of its teachers are discussed in Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524
U.S. 274 (1998); see infra text accompanying notes 142-145.
80. See Floyd v. Waiters, 133 F.3d 786, 789-90 (11th Cir. 1998)(discussing Title IX,
but not Title VI); Smith v. Metropolitan Sch. Dist. Perry Township, 128 F.3d
1014, 1018-21 (7th Cir. 1997)(same); Buchanan v. City of Bolivar, 99 F.3d 1352,
1356 (6th Cir. 1996); Nelson v. Temple Univ., 920 F. Supp. 633, 638 (E.D. Pa.
1996); Clay v. Board of Trustees, 905 F. Supp. 1488, 1495 (D. Kan. 1995); Bowers
v. Baylor Univ., 862 F. Supp. 142, 145-46 (W.D. Tex. 1994). But see Mennone v.
Gordon, 889 F. Supp. 53, 56 (D. Conn. 1995)(finding a cause of action under Title
IX).
81. In Smith v. Metropolitan Sch. Dist. Perry Township, 128 F.3d 1014, 1020-21 (7th
Cir. 1997), the court suggested that school officials may be liable under Title IX in
their official capacity even though they cannot be held liable in their individual
capacity. According to the court, official capacity liability will turn on state law
because of the need to identify the public authority with administrative control
over the school. However, the court also recognizes that an official capacity suit
against an officer is generally considered an action against the entity. See id. at
1021 n.3.
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from liability for damages by the Eleventh Amendment in a section
1983 action,8 2 whereas Congress has abrogated the Eleventh Amend-
ment in actions under Title VI.83 Fifth, a potential advantage of Title
VI lies in the availability of an administrative remedy through the
OCR in the DOE. Aggrieved persons may submit a complaint8 4 to the
OCR, which has an obligation to conduct an investigation8 5 and, if it
finds noncompliance, seek to resolve the complaint through either in-
formal means8 6 or the withholding of federal funds.8 7 As stated, ex-
haustion of these administrative remedies is not required before
initiating litigation under Title VI.88
In 1994 the DOE issued an Investigative Guidance outlining "pro-
cedures and analysis that OCR staff will follow when investigating
issues of racial incidents and harassment against students at educa-
tional institutions."8 9 At least one court relied on the Investigative
Guidance, giving it substantial deference and holding that a hostile
racial educational environment created by student-student harass-
ment is actionable under Title VI.90 The Investigative Guidance spe-
cifically addresses a hostile environment and how it should be
analyzed under Title VI:
A violation of Title VI may also be found if a recipient has created or is
responsible for a racially hostile environment-i.e., harassing conduct (e.g.,
physical, verbal, graphic, or written) that is sufficiently severe, pervasive or
persistent so as to interfere with or limit the ability of an individual to partici-
82. Neither states nor state agencies are "persons" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989). The Elev-
enth Amendment to the United States Constitution generally precludes a federal
court from awarding damages against the state treasury; however, it does not
prohibit prospective injunctive relief against state officials in their official capac-
ity. See CrVIL RIGHTS LIABILITY, supra note 56, at § 1:44. "However, damages can
be awarded against state officials in their individual capacity." Id.
83. When passing legislation pursuant to its power conferred by section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, Congress has the power to abrogate Eleventh Amend-
ment protection. See CIVIL RIGHTS LIABILITY, supra note 56, at § 1:46. Congress,
in 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7 (1994), abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity in ac-
tions brought under Title VI and Title IX. See also Litman v. George Mason, 186
F.3d 544, 549-57 (4th Cir. 1999)(stating that in passing 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a)(1),
Congress permissibly conditioned receipt of Title IX funds on an unambiguous
waiver of eleventh amendment immunity and the university, in accepting such
funding, consented to suit in federal court); see generally CIVIL RIGHTS LIABILITY,
supra note 56, at § 8:28; Fuller v. Rayburn, 161 F.3d 516, 518 (8th Cir. 1998);
Lesage v. Texas, 158 F.3d 213, 216-19 (5th Cir. 1998), rev'd on other grounds, 120
S. Ct. 467 (1999).
84. See 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(b)(1999).
85. See 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(c)(1999).
86. See 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(d)(1999).
87. See 34 C.F.R. § 100.8-100.11 (1999).
88. See supra note 72.
89. Racial Harassment Guidance, supra note 3, at 11,448.
90. See Monteiro v. Tempe Union High Sch. Dist., 158 F.3d 1022, 1033 (9th Cir.
1998).
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pate in or benefit from the services, activities or privileges provided by a recip-
ient. A recipient has subjected an individual to different treatment on the
basis of race if it has effectively caused, encouraged, accepted, tolerated or
failed to correct a racially hostile environment of which it has actual or con-
structive notice (as discussed below).
Under this analysis, an alleged harasser need not be an agent or employee
of the recipient, because this theory of liability under Title Vi is premised on a
recipient's general duty to provide a nondiscriminatory educational
environment.
To establish a violation of Title VI under the hostile environment theory,
OCR must find that: (1) A racially hostile environment existed; (2) the recipi-
ent had actual or constructive notice of the racially hostile environment; and
(3) the recipient failed to respond adequately to redress the racially hostile
environment. Whether conduct constitutes a hostile environment must be de-
termined from the totality of the circumstances, with particular attention paid
to the factors discussed below. 9 1
The "factors discussed below" are (i) the "severe, pervasive or persis-
tent standard," (ii) whether school officials had notice, actual or con-
structive, of the hostile environment, and (iii) the recipient's response
after receipt of notice.9 2
As stated in the portion of the Investigative Guidance quoted
above, "this theory of liability under Title VI is premised on a recipi-
ent's general duty to provide a nondiscriminatory educational environ-
ment." Once this duty is understood, then school district liability for a
breach of the duty flows naturally. Such a duty is consistent with the
requirements and purpose of Title VI, as well as the duty imposed on
school corporations by state law.9 3 Title VI provides that no person
shall "be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or
be subjected to discrimination" based on race by any program receiv-
ing federal financial assistance. In interpreting this language, the
DOE states:
Racially based conduct that has such an effect and that consists of differ-
ent treatment of students on the basis of race by recipients' agents or employ-
ees, acting within the scope of their official duties, violates Title VI. In
addition, the existence of a racially hostile environment that is created, en-
couraged, accepted, tolerated or left uncorrected by a recipient also constitutes
different treatment on the basis of race in violation of Title VI.9
4
Under this interpretation of Title VI, situations one through three9 5
are clearly covered by Title VI. If Title VI means anything, it must
reach schools that tolerate the deprivation of an equal educational op-
portunity based on race. Once a school has notice of a racially hostile
environment, the failure to take corrective action constitutes encour-
agement, acceptance, and toleration of a discriminatory environment.
91. Racial Harassment Guidance, supra note 3, at 11,449 (emphasis added).
92. Id. at 11,449-11,450.
93. See infra section IV.C.
94. Racial Harassment Guidance, supra note 3, at 11,448.
95. See supra text accompanying note 48.
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Situation four 96 may be covered too, if school officials were aware of
the deprivation of an equal educational opportunity before receipt of a
complaint, or took no affirmative steps to assure an equal educational
opportunity. In other words, the Investigative Guidance would sup-
port school liability when racial harassment by other students de-
prives a student of an equal educational, even absent a complaint from
the victim. As a condition of receiving federal financial assistance, a
school corporation gives the DOE "an assurance that the program will
be conducted... in compliance with all requirements imposed by or
pursuant to this part."9 7 This imposes an affirmative obligation to
provide an equal opportunity.
Notice to a school can be either actual or constructive, according to
the Investigative Guidance.9 8 Even where someone employed by the
school has actual notice of a racially hostile environment, a question
may still be raised about the sufficiency of the notice. For example,
does notice to a janitor, cook, coach, secretary, social worker, nurse, or
teacher suffice to impose a duty to act on the school corporation? The
answer should be yes, because the school corporation can impose on
any of its employees a duty to report to the principal or superinten-
dent, or some other designated official. To a student, several of the
employees listed, particularly teachers, represent the school. It would
therefore be reasonable for a student to assume she could report har-
assment to a teacher and expect corrective action. Similarly, it would
be reasonable for a student to assume she could report harassment to
a social worker or nurse, both of whom are professionals whose duties
relate to the well-being of students.
Students may find reporting harassment difficult and embarrass-
ing, and principals are not always the school employee most accessible
to students. Therefore, to encourage reporting by students and to
fully recognize the affirmative obligation of recipients of federal funds
to make available an equal educational opportunity, actual notice to
any school employee should reasonably be treated as actual notice to
the school corporation. Of course, a school may encourage reporting to
particular individuals through its policy, but a failure to report to one
of the preferred individuals should not relieve the school corporation
of liability.
Under the Investigative Guidance, constructive notice is sufficient
to trigger a school's duty to take corrective action. It provides that "[a]
recipient is charged with constructive notice of a hostile environment
if, upon reasonably diligent inquiry in the exercise of reasonable care,
96. See id.
97. 34 C.F.R. § 100.4(a)(1999).
98. See Racial Harassment Guidance, supra note 3, at 11,450. See infra note 191 and
accompanying text regarding the need for actual notice and to whom it must be
given.
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it should have known of the discrimination."99 This too flows natu-
rally from the affirmative obligation of a recipient of federal financial
assistance to ensure all students, regardless of race, an equal educa-
tional opportunity.
Another factor to be considered under the Investigative Guidance is
the recipient's response. "Once a recipient has notice of a racially hos-
tile environment, the recipient has a legal duty to take reasonable
steps to eliminate it."100 The appropriateness of the response will be
evaluated "by examining reasonableness, timeliness, and effective-
ness."10 1 An appropriate response, according to the Investigative Gui-
dance, will result in a finding of no violation.i 02 This means the OCR,
for purposes of administrative enforcement,J 0 3 will not impose strict
liability on the recipient of federal financial assistance, i.e., a school
will not be held responsible for injury incurred before it had notice of
the hostile environment and an opportunity to take corrective action.
Such a rule may be reasonable where students cause the hostile envi-
ronment, rather than a school employee, such as a teacher. However,
where a school employee causes the hostile environment, the school
should be liable for any injury incurred despite prompt corrective ac-
tion, for the same reason that notice to any school employee should be
sufficient. This resembles respondeat superior liability.i04 The "ap-
propriate response" defense should be treated as an affirmative de-
fense, with the burden of pleading and proof on the school
corporation.' 0 5
One objection to school liability for a hostile environment is the
difficulty in distinguishing between actionable harassment and "nor-
mal" or "typical" student behavior, including teasing. The Investiga-
tive Guidance addresses this concern, indicating that "[tlo determine
whether a racially hostile environment exists, it must be determined if
the racial harassment is severe, pervasive or persistent."' 0 6 Referring
99. Racial Harassment Guidance, supra note 3, at 11,450; see infra note 191 and ac-
companying text regarding the need for actual notice and to whom it must be
given.
100. Racial Harassment Guidance supra note 3, at 11,450.
101. Id. at 11,450.
102. See id. at 11,451.
103. Limitations on enforcement through the administrative process, where the ulti-
mate remedy is withholding of federal financial assistance, should not be applied
to the employed judicial remedy. See infra text accompanying notes 145-48.
104. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 805-09 (1998); Burlington In-
dus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 759-65 (1998).
105. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 763-65 (1998)(stating that an
employer's exercise of reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexu-
ally harassing behavior is part of the affirmative defense available in defending a
Title VII sexual harassment case when no tangible employment action is taken).
106. Racial Harassment Guidance, supra note 3, at 11,449.
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to these factors in the Investigative Guidance, the court in Monteiro v.
Tempe Union High School District stated:
Whether a hostile educational environment exists is a question of fact, de-
termined with reference to the totality of the circumstances, including the vic-
tim's race and age. Racial harassment creates a hostile environment if it is
sufficiently severe that it would interfere with the educational program of a
reasonable person of the same age and race as the victim. 10 7
This appears to draw the line between actionable racial harassment
and other "typical" student behavior in a reasonable manner. The key
factual inquiry is whether the challenged activity interferes with the
educational program, i.e., deprives the victim of an equal educational
opportunity based on race. If yes, then it violates Title VI. Courts
have to make a similar determination in sexual harassment claims
under Title VII, where the courts distinguish between actionable sex-
ual harassment and crude, boorish behavior that is inappropriate but
not a violation of Title VII.108
c. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)
This statute provides that "[a]ll persons ... shall have the same
right.., to make and enforce contracts.. . and to the full and equal
benefit of all laws ... as is enjoyed by white citizens . o"109 Section
1981 reaches both private and government discrimination.11o The
word "contracts" has been interpreted broadly and includes, for exam-
ple, a private school's refusal to admit students because of their
race.' Further, the term "make and enforce contracts" was defined
in 1991 to include "the making, performance, modification, and termi-
nation of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges,
terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship."' 12 Therefore,
since the 1991 amendment, section 1981 applies to racial harassment
in employment, education and other contractual relationships.113
Students and school officials engaged in racially harassing conduct
can be sued under section 1981. Municipal entities, such as the school
corporation or district, are subject to suit under section 1981, but the
107. Monteiro v. Tempe Union High Sch. Dist., 158 F.3d 1022, 1033 (9th Cir. 1998);
see infra note 196 for a discussion of actionable sexual harassment.
108. See CIVIL RIGHTS LIABILITY, supra note 56, at § 5:18.
109. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)(1994).
110. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981(c)(1994); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976); Jones v.
Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968); see generally CIVIL RIGHTS LIABILITY,
supra note 56, at § 3:07.
111. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976); see generally CIVIL RIGHTS LIABIL-
iTY, supra note 56, at § 3:11.
112. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b)(1994).
113. See, e.g., Spriggs v. Diamond Auto Glass, 165 F.3d 1015, 1017-19 (4th Cir. 1999);
Jackson v. Motel 6 Multipurpose, Inc., 130 F.3d 999, 1008 (11th Cir. 1997); Reyn-
olds v. CSX Transp., Inc., 115 F.3d 860, 866-67 (11th Cir. 1997); Dennis v. County
of Fairfax, 55 F.3d 151, 155 (4th Cir. 1995).
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plaintiff must show that she was injured as the result of a "policy,"
either explicit or implicit.ii4 Also, as discussed in the context of sec-
tion 1983, the actions of a policymaker constitute the "policy" of a mu-
nicipal entity."i 5
At least in public schools,1i6 the "full and equal benefit" clause di-
rectly addresses the student deprived of an equal educational opportu-
nity as a result of racial harassment by other students."i 7 As
discussed earlier, a student who must endure racial harassment in
school does not enjoy "the full and equal benefit of all laws" because
she is in an environment that interferes with her ability to learn." 8
While section 1981 is available to address a race-based denial of an
equal educational opportunity, it does not necessarily add to the scope
of coverage or relief available through section 1983 and Title VI.
2. Sexual Harassment
As with racial harassment, there are several federal laws, starting
with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, that
prohibit sex discrimination in public schools. At least since the Su-
preme Court's holding in Mississippi University for Women v. Ho-
gan, i i 9 it would violate the equal protection clause, as well as federal
statutes, if a public school were to exclude or subject a student to dif-
ferent terms and conditions because of her gender. Similarly, sexual
harassment directed at a student by a school administrator or teacher
would violate the law. Peer harassment based on sex, although it can
deprive a student of an education, is more difficult to remedy because
school officials are not directly responsible for the injury. Neverthe-
less, school officials have a duty to assure that all students have an
equal opportunity to learn, regardless of gender. Thus, the question
again is whether public schools and their officials can be held liable
when, because of their gender, students are deprived of an equal edu-
cational opportunity by other students.
114. See Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701 (1989); see generally CIL
RiGrrs LIABiLITY, supra note 56, at § 3:08; Federation of African-American Con-
tractors v. City of Oakland, 96 F.3d 1204, 1209-16 (9th Cir. 1996); Randle v. City
of Aurora, 69 F.3d 441, 446-50 (10th Cir. 1995).
115. See CrvIL RIGH-s LIABILrrY, supra note 56, at § 1:04.
116. Some courts hold that the equal benefit clause requires state action. See, e.g.,
Jones v. Poindexter, 903 F.2d 1006, 1010 (4th Cir. 1990); Pearson v. Duck, 871
F.2d 579, 581 (6th Cir. 1989); Mahone v. Waddle, 564 F.2d 1018, 1029-30 (3d Cir.
1977).
117. Although there has been relatively little litigation under the equal benefit clause,
see Crvm RIGHTs LIABILITY, supra note 56, at § 3:14, the language of the statute
clearly covers a denial of an equal educational opportunity. See, e.g., Gant ex rel.
Gant v. Wallingford Bd. of Educ., 195 F.3d 134 (2nd Cir. 1999).
118. See supra text accompanying notes 3-14.
119. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
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a. Fourteenth Amendment-Section 1983
Just as racial harassment is race discrimination, so too sexual har-
assment is sex discrimination.i 20 Application of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to sexual harassment in educa-
tion is essentially the same as applying it to racial harassment in edu-
cation. Although the Supreme Court applies strict scrutiny to race
discrimination and intermediate scrutiny1 21 to sex discrimination,
this difference is not significant here because it is just as unlikely that
a school could establish an important government interest (as re-
quired under intermediate scrutiny) to justify sexual harassment as it
is that a school could establish a compelling government interest to
justify racial harassment. In fact, it is inconceivable that a school
would ever defend either type of case by arguing it has an interest in
allowing harassment that interferes with an equal educational oppor-
tunity. Therefore, the issues related to using the equal protection
clause to address sexual harassment are the same as when the equal
protection clause is used to address racial harassment.
Some courts have erroneously held that "a § 1983 claim based on
the Equal Protection Clause is subsumed by Title IX."122 No evidence
exists that Congress, in passing Title IX without an express private
right of action, intended to eliminate a pre-existing equal protection
claim based on section 1983. Courts concluding that Title IX elimi-
nates equal protection claims based on section 1983 rely on two Su-
preme Court decisions, Smith v. Robinsonl2 3 and Middlesex County
Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Association.124 Na-
tional Sea Clammers does not apply because it deals with a different
issue - whether section 1983 can be utilized to enforce substantive
rights provided by a federal statute where the substantive statute it-
self provides a comprehensive enforcement scheme.12 5 The analogous
120. See, e.g., CIL RIGHTS LIABILITY, supra note 56, at § 5:16 n.42; David v. City and
County of Denver, 101 F.3d 1344 (10th Cir. 1996); Nicks v. Missouri, 67 F.3d 699
(8th Cir. 1995); Annis v. County Westchester, 36 F.3d 251 (2d Cir. 1994); Beards-
ley v. Webb, 30 F.3d 524 (4th Cir. 1994); Carrero v. New York City Housing Au-
thority, 890 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1989); Lipsett v. Univ. of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881
(1st Cir. 1988); Bohen v. City of East Chicago, Ind., 799 F.2d 1180 (7th Cir. 1986).
121. The intermediate scrutiny standard was first articulated in Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190 (1976), and, arguably, the level of scrutiny was heightened in United
States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
122. Bruneau v. South Kortright Cent. Sch. Dist., 163 F.3d 749, 757-59 (2d Cir. 1998),
cert denied 119 S. Ct. 2020 (1999). The Second Circuit indicates it is joining the
Third and Seventh Circuits, but recognizes that the Sixth, Eighth and Tenth Cir-
cuits have held that Title IX does not eliminate section 1983 actions to enforce
the Equal Protection Clause.
123. 468 U.S. 992 (1984).
124. 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
125. See National Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 19-21; see also Wright v. City of Roanoke
Redevelopment and Housing Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 427 (1987) (distinguishing Na-
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issue here would be whether section 1983 can be used to enforce Title
IX and National Sea Clammers does not control even this issue be-
cause Title IX, unlike the substantive statute at issue there, does not
address private enforcement actions.' 2 6
Smith is closer in that it at least addresses the same issue-
whether Congress can eliminate a section 1983 claim to enforce a con-
stitutional provision by incorporating those constitutional rights into
another federal statute. In Smith, the Court held that the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)127 provides the exclusive
means of enforcing the equal protection rights of elementary and sec-
ondary school students.128 However, Smith, the only Supreme Court
decision addressing this issue, was rendered meaningless when Con-
gress promptly amended the IDEA and indicated it did not intend to
eliminate section 1983 actions to enforce equal protection rights.129
Even though Congress cannot overrule a decision of the Court, and
thus Smith remains as precedent, it does not support the conclusion
reached in some Title IX cases because Title IX, unlike the IDEA, does
not provide a comprehensive enforcement scheme. 130 As noted ear-
lier, it does not even provide an express right of action.
b. Title IX of Education Amendments of 1972
Title IX generally prohibits sex discrimination by recipients of fed-
eral financial assistance.' 3 ' Most elementary and secondary public
schools, and many private schools, receive such assistance. The DOE
has the authority and obligation to enforce Title IX against educa-
tional institutions receiving federal financial assistance.132 Victims
can file discrimination complaints with the DOE OCR and, if it finds a
violation, it can attempt conciliation and ultimately initiate proceed-
ings to terminate the federal funds.133 Such complaints will be ad-
tional Sea Clammers as a case where the statute itself provided for private judi-
cial remedies (thereby evidencing congressional intent to supplant the section
1983 remedy)); see generally CIVIL RiGHrs LitBirry, supra note 56, at § 1:20.
126. The private right of action under Title IX is implied. See Cannon v. University of
Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
127. 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (1994). At the time Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 1009 (1984),
was decided, it was known as the Education for All Handicapped Children's Act.
128. See Smith, 468 U.S. at 1009-13.
129. See Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1994).
130. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (1994).
131. The prohibition on sex discrimination reads as follows: "No person in the United
States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance, except .... " 20 U.S.C.
§ 1681(a)(1994).
132. See 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1994); 34 C.F.R. § 106.1 (1999).
133. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.71 (1999), which adopts the enforcement provisions related to
Title VI, 34 C.F.R. §§ 100.6-100.11 and 34 C.F.R. § 101.
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dressed in accordance with the DOE Sexual Harassment Guidance
issued March 13, 1997.134 If a victim of discrimination is considering
litigation, exhaustion of this administrative remedy is not required.135
A private right of action exists to enforce Title IX in court 136 and
the implementing regulations adopted by the DOE are entitled to def-
erence in interpreting the statute. 3 7 At least some justices believe
agency regulations themselves may be enforced against public schools
through section 1983.138 The scope of the protection provided by Title
IX is generally the same as that provided by the Equal Protection
Clause, although it is not clear whether plaintiffs need to prove inten-
tional discrimination.13 9 However, neutral practices with a disparate
impact can be addressed if there is an applicable Title IX regulation
that reaches disparate impact.140
Several years after determining there was an implied private right
of action to enforce Title IX, the Court concluded that Title IX author-
ized a high school student who had been sexually harassed by a
teacher to recover damages from the school district.'41 However, in
Gebser v. Lago Vista Indepenent School District,14 2 the Court substan-
tially limited the circumstances in which a school corporation can be
held liable for injuries caused by a teacher who sexually harassed a
student, beginning in her eighth grade. In short, the Gesber Court
held that it "will not hold a school district liable in damages under
Title IX for a teacher's sexual harassment of a student absent actual
134. Sexual Harassment Guidance, supra note 4, at 12,033.
135. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979); see generally CIVIL
RIGHTS L1ABILITY, supra note 56, at § 8:36.
136. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979). As with Title VI, supra
note 80, the recipient-entity, rather than officials of the entity, may be the only
appropriate defendant. See, e.g., Soper ex rel. Soper v. Hoben, 195 F.3d 845 (6th
Cir. 1999), Doe v. School Administrative Dist. No. 19, 66 F. Supp. 2d 57 (D. Me.
1999), and Niles v. Nelson, 72 F. Supp. 2d 13 (N.D.N.Y. 1999), all suggesting
there is no individual capacity liability for violations of Title IX.
137. See 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1994); compare Monteiro v. Tempe Union High Sch. Dist.,
158 F.3d 1022, 1033 (9th Cir. 1998)(referring to Title VI, Racial Harassment Gui-
dance); with Doe v. University of Ill., 138 F.3d 653, 667 (7th Cir. 1998)(holding
that Title IX Sexual Harassment Guidance is not entitled to strict deference, but
"it merits our consideration"). Each federal agency providing federal financial
assistance is authorized by Congress to adopt regulations implementing Title IX.
See 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1994).
138. See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582 (1983); CIvIL RIGHTS
LIABILITY, supra note 56, at § 8:23.
139. See, e.g., Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agriculture, 998 F.2d 824, 832-33 (10th
Cir. 1993)(holding that intent not required to show a violation of Title IX);
Chance v. Rice Univ., 984 F.2d 151, 153 (5th Cir. 1993)(holding that a plaintiff
could not establish a prima facie case of disparate impact, even if that standard
should be applied to her Title IX claim).
140. See, e.g., 34 C.F.R. § 106.21-106.23 (1994).
141. See Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
142. 524 U.S. 274 (1998).
[Vol. 79:1
PEER HARASSMENT
notice and deliberate indifference."143 The "actual notice" must be to
"an official of the recipient entity with authority to take corrective ac-
tion to end the discrimination."1 44
Even though the private right of action to enforce Title IX is im-
plied, the Court looked to the express administrative remedy found in
Title IX, requiring notice to an appropriate person and an opportunity
to rectify any violation, for guidance in fashioning the implied damage
remedy. The Court held:
It would be unsound, we think, for a statute's express system of enforce-
ment to require notice to the recipient and an opportunity to come into volun-
tary compliance while a judicially implied system of enforcement permits
substantial liability without regard to the recipient's knowledge or its correc-
tive actions upon receiving notice.145
This logic appears unsound for several reasons. First, Congress views
the express administrative remedy, withholding of federal financial
assistance, as more drastic than the implied judicial remedy. Con-
gress overturned the Court's decision in Grove City College v. Belll 46
that limited coverage of the prohibition on discrimination to the spe-
cific program that receives federal funds, and expanded coverage to
the entire institution based on funding received by only one program.
But Congress continued to limit the administrative remedy-withhold-
ing federal funds-to the situation where the discrimination actually
takes place in the program receiving the federal funds.147 Thus, if a
university receives federal funds in its medical school, a victim of sex
discrimination in the athletic department has an implied right of ac-
tion under Title IX, but the federal financial assistance to the medical
school could not be terminated administratively based on the discrimi-
nation in the athletic department. The cutoff of federal financial as-
sistance is more drastic because the intended beneficiaries of the
funding are deprived of the benefits of the federal funds.148 In con-
trast, a more narrow damage judgment punishes the university, the
wrongdoer, for violating the law without affecting, at least not di-
rectly, the beneficiaries of the federal financial assistance.
143. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 292-93; see Willis v. Brown University, 184 F.3d 20 (1st Cir.
1999); Doe v. School Administrative Dist. No. 19, 66 F. Supp. 2d 57 (D. Me. 1999);
Turner v. McQuarter, 79 F. Supp. 2d 911 (N.D. IMI. 1999).
144. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290.
145. Id. at 289-90 (emphasis in original). The "express means of enforcement" re-
ferred to by the Court is found at 20 U.S.C. § 1682 and 34 C.F.R. §§ 100.7, 100.8
and 106.3.
146. 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
147. Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (1994). The program speci-
ficity requirement for administrative enforcement of Title IX is found in 20
U.S.C. § 1682 (1994). See CiviL RiHTs LIABILiTY, supra note 56, at § 8:14.
148. The Court recognized this in Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 704-
06 (1979).
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Second, the Court, in interpreting a law designed to end sex dis-
crimination in education, appears more concerned about the financial
health of the offending institution than it is about compensating the
victim of the illegal discrimination. This is evident from the majority's
concern that "an award of damages in a particular case might well
exceed a recipient's level of federal funding." i4 9 There is no basis for
this concern. When an institution accepts federal funds explicitly con-
ditioned on its agreementi5 0 to abide by the anti-discrimination provi-
sion and then proceeds to engage in discrimination that causes
injuries in excess of the federal funding, the institution has breached
its agreement with the federal government. It is not clear why the
Court should be concerned about imposing liability beyond the
amount of the federal funding. Compensatory damages are meant to
make victims whole, and the amount awarded should be governed by
the extent of the victim's injury, not the defendant's resources.1 5 1 At
least since Cannon v. University of Chicago152 in 1979, educational
institutions accepting federal financial assistance have been on notice
that victims of discrimination have a private right of action. The
unanimous decision in Franklin v. Gwinnet County Public School1 5 3
in 1992, which simply confirms the 1946 holding in Bell v. Hoodi 54
that "all appropriate remedies" are available in court unless Congress
expressly indicates otherwise, clearly placed such institutions on no-
tice that damages were available to victims of sex discrimination. If
149. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290. In contrast, the Court in Cedar Rapids Community Sch.
Dist. v. Garret F., 526 U.S. 66 (1999), was much less concerned with the financial
burden imposed upon the recipients of federal financial assistance pursuant to
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-87 (1994).
There the Court recognized that the school corporations "may have legitimate
financial concerns, but our role in this dispute is to interpret existing law."
Gebser, 524 U.S. at 77.
150. A Department of Education regulation, 34 C.F.R. § 106.4(a)(1999), reads as
follows:
Every application for Federal financial assistance for any education pro-
gram or activity shall as condition of its approval contain or be accompa-
nied by an assurance from the applicant or recipient, satisfactory to the
Assistant Secretary, that each education program or activity operated by
the applicant or recipient and to which this part applies will be operated
in compliance with this part. An assurance of compliance with this part
shall not be satisfactory to the Assistant Secretary if the applicant or
recipient to whom such assurance applies fails to commit itself to take
whatever remedial action is necessary in accordance with § 106.3(a) to
eliminate existing discrimination on the basis of sex or to eliminate the
effects of past discrimination whether occurring prior to or subsequent to
the submission to the Assistant Secretary of such assurance.
151. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254 (1978) (A defendant's resources may be
relevant to an award of punitive damages, but not compensatory damages.);
Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 36 n.5 (1983).
152. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
153. 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
154. 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
[Vol. 79:1
PEER HARASSMENT
this was not apparent to schools from Bell, it certainly was after the
1986 amendments abrogating Eleventh Amendment immunity.1 55
Upon close examination, Justice O'Connor's justifications for the
limited liability rule adopted in Gebser and discussed above are not
convincing. Once these stated justifications are exposed and under-
mined, it is apparent that they were simply a proxy for the Court's
unwillingness to give student victims of sexual harassment the benefit
of the normal rules of liability, agency, and relief. As pointed out by
Justice Stevens in his dissent, which was joined by three other jus-
tices, "[a] s a matter of policy, the Court ranks protection of the school
district's purse above the protection of immature high school students
that [agency] rules would provide.156
The decision in Gebser is particularly perplexing in light of the
Court's decisions a few days later in two Title VII cases involving sex-
ual harassment in employment.1 57 There the Court was willing to im-
pose "vicarious liability to a victimized employee for an actionable
hostile environment created by a supervisor with immediate (or suc-
cessively higher) authority over the employee."158 Under Title VII, an
affirmative defense is available to the employer when a supervisor's
harassment does not culminate "in a tangible employment action,
such as discharge, demotion, or undesirable reassignment."159 How-
ever, where the harassment does culminate in "a tangible employment
action," no affrmative defense is available to the employer.160 The
affirmative defense "comprises two necessary elements: (a) that the
employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly
any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee
unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective
opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm other-
wise,"161 and the employer bears the burden to establish the elements
of the defense.
Strict liability, without an available affirmative defense, is justi-
fied where there is "a tangible employment action" because "there is
an assurance the injury could not have been inflicted absent the
agency relation." 62 This, the Court concludes, satisfies the "aided in
accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation" require-
155. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7 (1994).
156. See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 306 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
157. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc.
v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
158. Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at 765.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 761-62.
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ment of Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219(2)(d).163 Such
"[t]angible employment actions are the means by which the supervisor
brings the official power of the enterprise to bear on subordinates."i 6 4
In contrast, harassment by nonsupervisors triggers employer liability
only where the employer "was negligent or reckless,"1 6 5 and an em-
ployer is "negligent with respect to sexual harassment if it knew or
should have known about the conduct and failed to stop it."166
Justice Stevens, in his dissent in Gebser, argued for application of
the standard found in Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219(2)(d):167
"This case presents a paradigmatic example of a tort that was made
possible, that was effected, and that was repeated over a prolonged
period because of the powerful influence that [the teacher] had over
[the student) by reason of the authority that his employer, the school
district, had delegated to him."16s In fact, Justice Stevens correctly
noted, "[a]s a secondary school teacher, [he] exercised even greater au-
thority and control over his students than employers and supervisors
exercise over their employees."169 Thus, vicarious liability should
have been imposed on the school district. Because the affirmative de-
fense issue had not been presented in Gebser, Justice Stevens did not
address it. 170
In her dissent in Gebser, joined by two justices, Justice Ginsburg
says she, "[i]n line with the tort law doctrine of avoidable conse-
quences, . . . would recognize as an affirmative defense to a Title IX
charge of sexual harassment, an effective policy for reporting and re-
dressing such misconduct."17 i To take advantage of this defense, the
school district would have "to show that its internal remedies were
adequately publicized and likely would have provided redress without
exposing the complainant to undue risk, effort, or expense." 172 She
concludes that a plaintiff who "unreasonably failed to avail herself of
the school district's preventive and remedial measures, and conse-
quently suffered avoidable harm, . . . would not qualify for Title IX
relief."17 3 Under the doctrine of avoidable consequences, to which
Justice Ginsburg refers, a defendant does not avoid liability unless all
harm was avoidable by the plaintiff. Normally that doctrine resem-
163. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(d) (1957); see Burlington Indus., 524
U.S. at 760-65.
164. Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at 762.
165. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, § 219(2)(b) (1957).
166. Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at 759.
167. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, § 219(2)(d) (1957).
168. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 299 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
169. Id.
170. See id. at 304.
171. Id. at 307 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting).
172. Id.
173. Id.
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bles a mitigation requirement and simply reduces the amount of dam-
ages and allows compensation for the harm that could not be
avoided.174 As an affirmative defense, it places the burden of both
pleading and proving the defense on the defendant.
As demonstrated by the dissenting opinion of Justice Stevens, ap-
plication of Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219(2)(d) in Gebser
would have led to a different result.1 7 5 Justice O'Connor's attempt in
Gebser to distinguish Title VII from Title IX-based on the fact that
Title VII expressly provides for damages and the Title VII prohibition
against discrimination in employment runs against an "employer,"
which is defined to include "any agent"17 6-is simply not convincing.
First, the fact that Title VII provides an express right of action and
Title IX an implied right of action, according to Franklin and Bell, is
not relevant when it comes to the courts' power to impose liability or
provide a remedy.177 Second, the Court in Burlington Industries and
Faragher did not rely on the definition of "employer" in Title VII as its
basis for imposing vicarious liability on employers. Rather, it applied
general agency law.178 The same should be true under Title IX, as
recognized by the Department of Education in its Sexual Harassment
Guidance.179 Application of agency law in Gebser, like that reflected
in Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219(2)(d), would lead to the same
result reached in Burlington Industries and Faragher-the employer
(school district) would have been held liable for the sexual harassment
of one of its agents, the teacher, who "brings the official power of the
enterprise to bear on subordinates"'iSO (students) just like a supervisor
in the employment context. Justice Stevens correctly recognized that
the teacher-student sexual harassment case presents an even stronger
case for employer/institution liability than the supervisor-employee
sexual harassment case because a teacher has greater authority and
control over his students than a supervisor over subordinates. Fur-
thermore, the sexual abuse of the student-like the sexual abuse of an
employee-"was made possible only by [the teacher's] affirmative mis-
use of his authority as her teacher."' 8 '
174. See Burlington Indus., Inc., 524 U.S. at 764; Lawson v. Trowbridge, 153 F.3d 368,
376-78 (7th Cir. 1998); Outboard Marine Corp. v. Babcock Indus., Inc., 106 F.3d
182, 184-85 (7th Cir. 1997); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTs § 918 (1977).
175. See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 298-301.
176. Id. at 280-84.
177. See Franklin v. Gwinnet County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 66-71 (1992) (confirming
the longstanding general rule that, absent clear direction to the contrary by Con-
gress, where there is a cause of action under a federal statute, the federal courts
have the power to award any appropriate relief).
178. Burlington Indus., Inc., 524 U.S. at 760-65; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 801-09.
179. Sexual Harassment Guidance, supra note 4, at 12,039-40.
180: Burlington Indus., Inc., 524 U.S. at 762.
181. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 300.
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About a year after deciding Gebser, the Court again addressed the
scope of Title IX in determining whether a school district can be held
liable for harm resulting from student-student harassment in elemen-
tary or secondary schools. In another 5-4 opinion, with the four dis-
senters in Gebser joining Justice O'Connor, the Court in Davis v.
Monroe County Board of Education,1i2 held that the plaintiff stated a
claim for relief under Title IX. The court of appeals in DavisiS3 af-
firmed a dismissal for failure to state a claim under Title IX "because
Congress gave no clear notice to schools and teachers that they, rather
than society as a whole, would accept responsibility for remedying stu-
dent-student sexual harassment when they chose to accept federal fi-
nancial assistance under Title IX."184 This holding rested on the
court's conclusion that "an enactment under the Spending Clause
must unambiguously disclose to would-be recipients all facts material
to their decision to accept Title IX funding"185 and Congress failed to
provide such notice of potential liability for student-student harass-
ment in the language or history of the statute. Assuming the Court in
Franklin recognized a Title IX cause of action for teacher-student sex-
ual harassment, but suggesting it was dicta, the Eleventh Circuit in
Davis was unwilling to extend it to student-student sexual
harassment.18 6
Dismissal of the claim in Davis for failure to state a claim is incon-
sistent with Franklin and Gebser, both of which recognized that sex-
ual harassment is a form of sex discrimination prohibited by Title IX.
In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,i8 7 the Supreme Court's first sex-
ual harassment case, the Court recognized that sexual harassment,
like racial harassment, is a form of discrimination because it consti-
tutes an arbitrary barrier to equality. A victim of racial or sexual har-
assment in the workplace is denied an equal employment opportunity
because she is subjected to different terms and conditions of employ-
ment because of her race or sex.1 8 8 Very simply, an employer with a
racially or sexually hostile work environment says, "you can work
here, but because of your race or sex you will have to tolerate abuse."
Similarly, a school district in which teachers abuse students be-
cause of their race or sex is saying "you can attend school, but because
of your race or sex you will have to tolerate abuse by your teachers."
There can be little doubt that such abuse, directed at certain students
182. 119 S. Ct. 1661 (1999). The four justices who joined O'Connor in Gebser-Rehn-
quist, Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas all dissented in Davis.
183. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 120 F.3d 1390 (11th Cir. 1997), cert.
granted, 119 S. Ct. 29 (1998).
184. Davis, 120 F.3d at 1406.
185. Id.
186. See id. at 1400 n.14.
187. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
188. See id. at 66.
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because of their race or sex, is a form of race or sex discrimination and
deprives the victims of an equal educational opportunity. It is no dif-
ferent than a teacher saying to a student "because of your race or sex I
will not provide you with the materials supplied to the other students
in this class." Would the Eleventh Circuit say in the latter situation
that a student deprived of class materials by her teacher, because of
her sex, does not have a Title IX claim? Of course not.
Assume that a teacher, instead of directly depriving a student of
class materials because of her sex, tells a few of her male classmates
to "steal" her materials after class and return them to the teacher.
Presumably the same result-even in the Eleventh Circuit the victim
could state a claim under Title IX. Now assume that the same teacher
neither withholds the class materials from a student because of her
sex, nor directs her classmates to deprive her of the materials, but
instead knows the classmates are taking her materials and decides to
do nothing about it.'s9 Clearly the victim is still being deprived of an
equal educational opportunity and she should have a Title IX claim
against the school district. In each of these examples, if we change the
act that causes a denial of equal educational opportunity from a depri-
vation of class materials to sexual harassment, the result should be
the same. The victim is still denied an equal educational opportunity
because of her sex.
The first example, where the teacher says to a student "because of
your sex I will not provide you with the materials supplied to the other
students in this class," is actually the Gebser situation if we convert
the teacher's action to sexual harassment. Even Justice O'Connor
would say the school district could be held liable for the action of the
teacher who deprives a female student of class materials because of
her sex, but only if "an official of the recipient entity with authority to
take corrective action to end the discrimination"190 had actual notice
of the teacher's action and was deliberately indifferent to the discrimi-
nation. Thus, while Gebser suggests the lower court in Davis is wrong
because sexual harassment of students is actionable under Title IX,
Gebser creates another hurdle for the plaintiff-victim in Davis. Apply-
ing the Gebser standard for school district liability, the victim of stu-
dent-student harassment will have to show that a school official "with
189. The Court in Davis uses a similar example:
Consider, for example, a case in which male students physically threaten
their female peers every day, successfully preventing the female stu-
dents from using a particular school resource - an athletic field or a com-
puter lab, for instance. District administrators are well aware of the
daily ritual, yet they deliberately ignore requests for aid from the female
students wishing to use the resource.
119 S. Ct. at 1675.
190. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290.
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authority to take corrective action and to end the discrimination"19 1
had actual notice of the student-student harassment and was deliber-
ately indifferent to the discrimination. Presumably school officials
such as teachers and counselors have authority to deal with student-
student harassment, just like they have authority to deal with a situa-
tion where one student assaults another, and therefore their knowl-
edge would be sufficient to render the school corporation liable.
In Davis, the Court answered some of the questions relating to stu-
dent-student harassment. First, it held that at least "in certain lim-
ited circumstances," a school district's "deliberate indifference to
known acts of harassment... amounts to an intentional violation of
Title IX, capable of supporting a private damages action."192 Here,
the Court noted that both the Title IX regulatory scheme and the com-
mon law placed schools on notice that they may be liable for their fail-
ure to respond to the discriminatory acts of third parties.193 However,
the Court was quick to note the limits on a school district's liability. A
recipient of federal funds can be held liable only where it "exercises
substantial control over both the harasser and the context in which
the known harassment occurs." i 9 4 Further, Justice O'Connor stressed
that the deliberate indifference standard adequately protects school
administrators because they "must merely respond to known peer har-
assment in a manner that is not clearly unreasonable."' 95
Second, the Court emphasized the meaning of "discrimination" and
the fact that harassment is a form of discrimination. Therefore, recip-
ients are "liable in damages [under Title IXI only where they are delib-
erately indifferent to sexual harassment, of which they have actual
knowledge, that is so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that
it can be said to deprive the victims of access to the educational oppor-
tunities or benefits provided by the school." i 96 While physical exclu-
191. Id. "Because officials' roles vary among school districts, deciding who exercises
substantial control for the purposes of Title IX liability is necessarily a fact-based
inquiry." Murrell v. School Dist. No. 1, 186 F.3d 1238, 1247 (10th Cir. 1999).
Where school officials did not have knowledge of the harassment until after the
fact, and promptly acted to correct the situation after learning of it, the defend-
ants were not liable under Title IX. Soper ex rel. Soper v. Hoben, 195 F.3d 845,
855 (6th Cir. 1999); see also Wills v. Brown University, 184 F.3d 20, 25-27 (1st
Cir. 1999).
192. Davis, 119 S. Ct. at 1671.
193. See id. at 1671-72.
194. Id. at 1672. For example, in Davis most of the harassment took place in the
classroom.
195. Id. at 1674.
196. Id. at 1675. The Court did not specify which school officials have to have actual
notice, however, the Gebser standard, one with "authority to take corrective ac-
tion and to end the discrimination," suggests a wide range of school officials
would satisfy the requirement because most officials have the authority to take
corrective action against students. 524 U.S. at 290, see supra note 191.
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sion from educational opportunities is not necessary, victim-students
must show they "are effectively denied equal access to an institution's
resources and opportunities."1 9 7 To address the concerns of the dis-
senting justices, the majority was careful to point out that "simple acts
of teasing and name-calling among school children" will not support
private damage actions because they will be limited to "cases having a
systemic effect on educational programs or activities . *..."198 It is
unlikely, but not impossible, that a single instance of peer harassment
will be sufficiently severe to meet the standard.199
The Court in Davis properly viewed student-student sexual har-
assment as a denial of or interference with an equal educational op-
portunity, rather than simply "sexual harassment." Obviously, the
same is true of racial harassment. School districts are on notice that
Title VI and Title IX require them to provide an equal educational
opportunity to all children, regardless of race or sex. Public schools
have been on notice of this general obligation at least since Brown2 00
(race) in 1954 and Hogan2 Oi (sex) in 1982. They have had more spe-
cific notice at least since DOE issued its Investigative Guidance re-
garding racial harassment 20 2 in 1994 and its guidance regarding
sexual harassment 20 3 in 1997. Similarly, the assurances required by
the DOE of all recipients of federal funds give clear notice that all
students are entitled to an equal educational opportunity, regardless
of race or gender.20 4
In the third example above - where the teacher neither withholds
the class materials from a student because of her sex, nor directs her
classmates to deprive her of the materials, but instead knows the
classmates are taking her materials and decides to do nothing about it
- the question is whether the school district can be held liable under
Where the plaintiff alleged that over the course of a month a high school stu-
dent repeatedly took her "to a secluded area and battered, undressed, and sexu-
ally assaulted her" the wrongdoing was "sufficiently severe, pervasive and
objectively offensive" to state a claim. Murrell v. School Dist. No. 1, 186 F.3d
1238, 1248 (10th Cir. 1999); see Soper ex rel. Soper v. Hoben, 195 F.3d 845, 854-55
(6th Cir. 1999).
197. Davis, 119 S. Ct. at 1675.
198. Id. at 1675-76. In Davis, the drop in the victim's grades "provides necessary evi-
dence of a potential link between her education and [the harassment]," but her
ability to state a claim "depends equally on the alleged persistence and severity of
[the harassment], not to mention the Board's alleged knowledge and deliberate
indifference." Id. at 1676.
199. See id. at 1676. But see Doe v. School Admin. Dist. No. 19, 66 F. Supp. 2d 57, 62
(D. Me. 1999) ("[A] student's claim of hostile environment [under Title IX] can
arise from a single incident").
200. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
201. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
202. Racial Harassment Guidance, supra note 3.
203. Sexual Harassment Guidance, supra note 4.
204. See 34 C.F.R. § 100.4 (1999)(race); 34 C.F.R. § 106.4 (1999)(sex).
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Title IX for the action, or inaction, of the teacher. For several reasons,
the argument for liability here is stronger than in Gebser. Based on
the agency principles discussed in Burlington Industries, this example
presents a good case for school district liability under Restatement
(Second) of Agency § 219(1): "[a] master is subject to liability for the
torts of his servants committed while acting in the scope of their em-
ployment."20 5 As recognized by the Court in Burlington Industries, an
employer "may be liable for both negligent and intentional torts com-
mitted by an employee within the scope of his or her employment." 20 6
While the Court was quick to conclude that, as a general rule, "sexual
harassment by a supervisor is not conduct within the scope of employ-
ment,"20 7 a teacher's failure to correct an obvious denial of an equal
educational opportunity certainly falls within the scope of his employ-
ment. In fact, the core job of a teacher is to provide equal opportuni-
ties to all children. Elimination of the personal motive, present when
a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate or a teacher sexually ha-
rasses a student, facilitates a finding of action within the scope of em-
ployment here.
Even if it is determined that this teacher did not act within the
scope of his employment, Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219(2)
provides a basis for school district liability.
(2) A master is not subject to liability for the torts of his servants acting
outside the scope of their employment, unless:
(a) the master intended the conduct or the consequences, or
(b) the master was negligent or reckless, or
(c) the conduct violated a non-delegable duty of the master, or
(d) the servant purported to act or to speak on behalf of the principal and
there was reliance upon apparent authority, or he was aided in accomplishing
the tort by the existence of the agency relation.2 0 8
Subparts (b) through (d) may trigger school district liability in this
example. In considering subpart (b) in Burlington Industries, the
Court stated "[a]n employer is negligent with respect to sexual harass-
ment if it knew or should have known about the conduct and failed to
stop it."209 Similarly, a school district acts negligently with respect to
a denial of an equal educational opportunity if it knew or should have
known of it and failed to address it. Thus, actual knowledge is not
required and since teachers have direct responsibility for the educa-
tion of students, the school district has actual knowledge of the depri-
vation in this example. Because school districts have a nondelegable
duty to provide all students with an equal educational opportunity,
205. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(1) (1957).
206. Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at 756.
207. Id. at 757.
208. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2) (1957).
209. Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at 759.
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subpart (c) also supports school district liability where a student is
deprived of such an opportunity.21 0
Finally, subpart (d), relied upon by the Court in Burlington Indus-
tries, supports vicarious liability when a teacher knows a student's
classmates are taking her materials, but the teacher does nothing
about it. Because a teacher has actual power to address the educa-
tional opportunity of his students, the "aided... by the existence of
the agency relation7211 prong is most relevant here. Burlington In-
dustries holds that this prong requires "something more than the em-
ployment relation itself," and in that context the something more was
the ability of a supervisor to take "a tangible employment action
against a subordinate."2 2 By analogy, here the something more
would be the teacher's ability to take a tangible education action
against the student, such as the failure to provide an equal educa-
tional opportunity. Like with the supervisor in Burlington Industries,
the injury suffered by the student, denial of an equal educational op-
portunity, "could not have been inflicted absent the agency rela-
tion."2 13 While the student here complains of inaction by the teacher,
the teacher really takes an active role because he decides to proceed
with his class, knowing some students do not have the required mater-
ials. The Court says a tangible employment action "in most cases in-
210. The lower court in Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 120 F.3d 1390, 1399-00
n.13 (11th Cir. 1997), said there is no nondelegable duty to eliminate student-
student harassment because students are not agents of the school board. This
misses the point because the nondelegable duty is to provide all students with an
equal educational opportunity and it is the agents of the school-superintendent,
principal, teachers and others-who fail in this duty. The source of the distraction
is not determinative. See, e.g., Carabba v. Anacortes Sch. Dist. No. 103, 435 P.2d
936, 946-47 (Wash. 1967)(holding specifically that a school district was liable for
the negligence of a referee who failed to notice an illegal hold on the plaintiff in a
wrestling match; and generally that school districts owe a nondelegable duty to
provide protection to students).
211. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(d).
212. Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at 2268-69; see also Kracunas v. Iona College, 119
F.3d 80, 87 (2nd Cir. 1997)(citing section 219(2)(d) where a college student al-
leged harassment by a professor, and holding that the professor acted as the
school's agent in his role of professor, the school placed him in a position of au-
thority vis a vis his students, and "his blatant abuse of that authority... [was]
sufficient under agency principles to impute liability to [the college]"); Lipsett v.
University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 900 n.21 (1st Cir. 1988) (noting in a suit
by a participant in a surgical residency training program that a supervisor who
sexually harasses a subordinate is almost always aided by the agency relation-
ship). But see Smith v. Metropolitan Sch. Dist. Perry Township, 128 F.3d 1014,
1029-30 (7th Cir. 1997)(holding that teacher harassment of a student was not
accomplished through conduct associated with the agency status and there was
no evidence any school official had actual knowledge of the relationship); Canu-
tillo Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Leija, 101 F.3d 393, 400-03 (5th Cir. 1996)(holding school
district liable for harassment of a student by a teacher because management-
level official knew or should have known of the teacher's misconduct).
213. Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at 761.
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flicts direct economic harm."2 14 A tangible education action, such as
denial of required materials, is less likely to inflict a direct economic
harm but it is just as tangible and its adverse effect on the goal of
school attendance (gain an education) is just as direct as the effect of
harassment on the goal of employment (obtain wages).
Though the decision in Davis is important and a step in the right
direction, the majority is unnecessarily cautious. As in Gebser, there
is more concern for the schools and their financial condition than for
the victims of harassment. Title IX, like Title VI, is so clearly about
equal educational opportunity that any deprivation of such an oppor-
tunity, not corrected by school officials if they knew or should have
known of it, should be actionable. Instead of imposing an affirmative
obligation on school officials to assure an equal educational opportu-
nity, Davis may encourage them to bury their heads in an effort to
avoid "actual knowledge" of a deprivation of such an opportunity. Of
course, there will be difficult proof problems in some cases and schools
will have to devote resources to defending harassment claims. How-
ever, school officials have the ability to avoid liability by aggressive
policies and actions designed to protect students from a deprivation of
equal opportunity caused by the actions of other students.
c. Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA)
The VAWA215 provides a cause of action for victims of a "crime of
violence motivated by gender,"21 6 where the underlying act of violence
constitutes a felony under state or federal law.2 i 7 Cases have held
that proof of gender motivation resembles proof of sex discrimination
under Title VII. To satisfy the "crime of violence" requirement, there
must be "an act or series of acts that would constitute a felony against
the person ... and that would come within the meaning of State or
Federal offenses described in [18 U.S.C. § 16]."218 Sexual harassment
may or may not involve conduct that would constitute a felony under
state or federal law. Therefore, while sexual harassment is generally
"motivated by gender," only the more serious type of harassment will
be actionable under the VAWA. Victims of sexual harassment and
abuse are beginning to assert claims under the VAWA,219 usually in
conjunction with other claims.
214. Id. at 767.
215. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994); see Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. and State
Univ., 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir.), cert. granted United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct.
11 (1999)(holding that the VAWA is unconstitutional because it exceeds the power
of Congress under the Commerce Clause).
216. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c)(1994).
217. See 42 U.S.C. § 13981(d)(2)(1994).
218. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(d)(2)(1994).
219. See, e.g., Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. and State Univ., 169 F.3d 820
(4th Cir.); Doe v. Hartz, 134 F.3d 1339 (8th Cir. 1998); Ericson v. Syracuse Univ.,
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While the VAWA provides a cause of action against student perpe-
trators, it is not clear whether a school corporation can be held liable
under the VAWA for the actions of students.2 20 When a VAWA plaintiff
establishes liability, she can recover damages, both compensatory and
punitive, injunctive relief and attorney fees.
B. Private Schools-Federal Claims
Because of the state action requirement, victims of racial and sex-
ual harassment will not be able to seek relief based on the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and section 1983.
However, the remaining federal claims discussed above do not require
state action and, therefore, application of these laws to harassment in
private schools generally should be the same as their application to
harassment in public schools.221
C. State Law Claims Against Schools and Student
Perpetrators
There are several potential state law claims arising out of peer har-
assment in schools. Most state constitutions contain a provision simi-
lar to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and
some have a special provision relating to educational opportunity.
Like Fourteenth Amendment claims, state constitution claims will
generally be limited to public schools because of the state action re-
quirement. Some states also have civil rights statutes that address
race and sex discrimination in schools. Depending on the scope of
such statutes, they may apply to harassment in elementary and secon-
dary schools. In addition, there are a number of common law claims
that may be available, depending on state law and the nature of the
harassment. These include assault and battery, intentional infliction
of emotional distress, tortious interference with the educational rela-
tionship, negligence/failure to protect students, and negligent hiring
and/or retention.
45 F. Supp. 2d 344 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Liu v. Striuli, 36 F. Supp. 2d 452 (D.R.I.
1999); McCann v. Rosquist, 998 F. Supp. 1246 (D. Utah 1998); Truong v. Smith,
28 F. Supp. 2d 626 (D. Colo. 1998); Ziegler v. Ziegler, 28 F. Supp. 2d 601 (E.D.
Wash. 1998); Braden v. Piggly Wiggly, 4 F. Supp. 2d 1357 (M.D. Ala. 1998); Fin-
ley v. Higbee Co., 1 F. Supp. 2d 701 (N.D. Ohio 1998); Mattison v. Click Corp. of
America, 1998 WL 32597 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 27, 1998); Crisonino v. New York City
Hous. Auth., 985 F. Supp. 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Anisimov v. Lake, 982 F. Supp.
531 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Newton v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. Consol., 958 F. Supp. 248
(W.D.N.C. 1997).
220. Respondeat superior liability under the VAWA is discussed, but not decided, in
Braden v. Piggly Wiggly, 4 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1362 (M.D. Ala. 1998).
221. In cases against private schools, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) is not available to en-
force regulations adopted pursuant to Title VI or Title IX. See supra note 2.
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1. State Constitutions
Most state constitutions have a provision similar to the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.22 2 For example, the In-
diana Constitution states: "Equal privileges - The General Assembly
shall not grant to any citizen, or class of citizens, privileges or immu-
nities, which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citi-
zens."2 23 While it has rejected the U.S. Supreme Court's approach,
i.e., utilizing different levels of scrutiny depending on the nature of
the classification and the deprivation, in interpreting the Equal Pro-
tection Clause,224 the Indiana Supreme Court has not yet demon-
strated that the results will be significantly different under the "equal
privileges" provision in the Indiana Constitution.
Assuming victims' rights are no greater under their state's consti-
tutional equivalent of the federal equal protection clause, the broad
remedies available under section 1983 may make the federal claim
more attractive than the state claim. However, it may be easier to
hold the school corporation liable under state law based on respondeat
superior. Further, there may be situations where a victim wants to
file an action in state court and reliance exclusively on the state con-
stitution would preclude removal2 25 by the defendants.
Some states have a constitutional provision that expressly ad-
dresses equality in elementary and secondary education.2 26 Again,
the Indiana Constitution provides an example:
Knowledge and learning, generally diffused throughout a community, be-
ing essential to the preservation of a free government; it shall be the duty of
the General Assembly... to provide, by law, for a general and uniform system
of Common Schools, wherein the tuition shall be without charge, and equally
open to all. 2 2 7
While there are few cases interpreting this section, the plain meaning
of the language suggests it could be used to address a race-based or a
gender-based deprivation of an equal educational opportunity.
222. See, e.g., ARiz. CONST. art. II, § 13; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2;
ILL. CONST. art I, § 2; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 2; NM CONST. art. 2, § 18; NY CONST.
art I, § 11; OH CONST. art. I, § 2; SD CONST. art. 6, § 18; Tex. CoNsT. art. 1, § 3.
223. IND. CONST., art. I, § 23.
224. See, e.g., Collins v. Day, 644 N.E.2d 72 (Ind. 1994).
225. Removal from state court to federal court is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1441-44
(1994) and is generally limited to cases that could have been filed in federal court.
226. See, e.g., MICH. CONST., art. VIII, § 2; CAL. CONST., art. I, § 31; MoNT. CONsT., art.
X, § 1; N.J. CONST., art. I, § 5.
227. IND. CONST., art. VII, § 1.
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2. State Civil Rights Statutes
Many states have a civil rights statute prohibiting race and sex
discrimination, however, such state laws vary widely.2 2 8 Some state
statutes specifically address discrimination in educational institu-
tions. 22 9 While it is unlikely that state civil rights statutes will pro-
vide relief where the federal civil rights laws do not, in considering a
claim based on harassment it is worth consulting such state laws. It is
important to determine whether the relevant state law reaches dis-
crimination or harassment in education, whether it provides for ad-
ministrative enforcement, whether it provides for a private right of
action, and the type of relief available.
3. State Tort Claims
In most jurisdictions, there are tort claims available against the
students engaged in the harassment, or their parents.23 0 In many sit-
uations, however, such claims are not worth pursuing because of the
limited resources of such defendants. Where there is a chance of re-
covery, or the harassment continues because school officials refuse to
address it, there may be reason to pursue these claims. Tort theories
to be considered include assault and battery,23 1 intentional or negli-
228. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 22-9-1-2 (1999); N.Y. CiviL, RImHTS LAv § 40 (McKinney
1992); MICH. Coi~P. LAWS ANN. § 37.2102 (West 1985 & Supp. 1999); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 363.12 (West 1991 & Supp. 1999); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:1-3 (West 1993).
229. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 14.18.010 (Michie 1999); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 200 (West
1994 & Supp. 1999); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-15c (West 1996 & Supp. 1998);
D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2511 (1999); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 228.2001 (West 1998); IND.
CODE § 20-8.1-2-1 (1999); IOWA CODE ANN. § 216.9 (West 1994); LA. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 17:1941 and § 17:111 (West 1982 & Supp. 1999); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN.
ch. 151C, § 2 (West 1996); N.Y. EDUC. LAw §§ 3201-a (McKinney 1995) and 313
(McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1999); MICH. ComE'. LAWs ANN. § 37.2402 (West 1985);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-307 (1999); NEB. REv. STAT. § 79-2,116 (Reissue 1999);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A.36-20 (West 1999); OR. REV. STAT. § 659.150 (1989 & Supp.
1998); 24 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 5002 (West 1992 & Supp. 1999); 24 PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 24, § 20-2014-A (West 1992); R.I. GEN. LAvs § 16-38-1.1 (1999); S.D.
CODIFIED LAws § 20-13-22 (Michie 1995); TEx. EDUCATION CODE ANN. § 1.002
(West 1996); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 1 (Supp. 1999); WASHINGTON REv. CODE
ANN. § 28A-640.010 (West 1997); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 118.13 (West 1999).
230. See, e.g., CAL. CirV. CODE § 1714.1 (West 1998); IND. CODE § 34-31-4-1 (1999); 740
ILL. Co p. STAT. § 115/3 & 115/5 (West 1998); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAw § 3-112 (Mc-
Kinney 1989 & Supp. 1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.10 (West 1995 & Supp.
1999); TEX. F~x. CODE ANN. § 41.001-002 (West 1996); TEX. FAi. CODE ANN.
§ 41.003 (West 1996 & Supp. 2000); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 4.24.190 (West 1988
& Supp. 2000); W.VA. CODE § 55-7A-2 (1994 & Supp. 1999).
231. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 13, 18, and 21 (1965); W. PAGE KEETON
ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 39-42 & 43-46 (5th ed. 1984);
see, e.g., Archer v. EEOC, 30 F. Supp. 2d 600 (E.D.N.Y. 1998); Kelley v. Worley,
29 F. Supp. 2d 1304 (M.D. Ala. 1998); Grozdanich v. Leisure Hills Health Ctr.,
Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d 953 (D. Minn. 1998); Davis v. Palmer Dodge West, Inc., 977 F.
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gent infliction of emotional distress,2 32 and tortious interference with
the educational relationship, which is in the nature of a contract be-
tween the school and student.2 33 Claims against the school corpora-
tion are more likely to result in a recovery of damages, but
establishing liability is more difficult. Aside from a duty to provide an
equal educational opportunity, schools have a duty to supervise and
protect students.23 4 This duty arises from the special relationship be-
tween a school and its students.
While there is no general duty "to control the conduct of a third
person as to prevent him from causing physical harm to another,"
there is such a duty when a "special relation exists."2 35 Courts have
relied on this and related sections of the Restatement in holding that
school corporations may be liable for injuries to students caused by the
conduct of other students.2 3 6 Another section of the Restatement, im-
posing a duty on one with "custody of another under circumstances
such as to deprive the other of his normal power of self-protection" to
control the conduct of third persons,2 37 can be applied to student-stu-
dent harassment because a student while in school is deprived of the
protection of her parents or guardian.2 38
Supp. 917 (S.D. Ind. 1997); Barnard v. City of Chicago Heights, 692 N.E.2d 733
(Ill. App. Ct. 1998).
232. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROS-
SER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 54-66 & 359-65 (5th ed. 1984); Hartsell v.
Duplex Products, Inc., 123 F.3d 766 (4th Cir. 1997).
233. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 (1965); see also Bochnowski v. Peo-
ples Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n, 571 N.E.2d 282 (Ind. 1991) (regarding interference
with employment relationship).
234. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 314, 315, 320 (1965); see also
Doe v. School Admin. Dist. No. 19, 66 F. Supp. 2d 57, 68 (D. Me. 1999)(holding
that school owed a duty to the plaintiff to investigate claims of sexual
misconduct).
235. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965).
236. See, e.g., Garcia v. City of New York, 646 N.Y.S.2d 508 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1996); Todd
M. v. Richard L., 696 A.2d 1063 (Conn. Sup. Ct. 1995); Turner v. Central Local
Sch. Dist., __ N.E.2d -, 1995 WL 442498 (Ohio Ct. App., July 27, 1995);
Mirand v. City of New York, 598 N.Y.S.2d 464 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993); Logan v. City
of New York, 543 N.Y.S.2d 661 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989); Leger v. Stockton Unified
Sch. Dist., 202 Cal. App. 3d 1448 (1988); Comuntzis v. Pinellas County Sch. Bd.,
508 So. 2d 750 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987); District of Columbia v. Doe, 524 A.2d 30
(D.C. 1987); Rodriguez v. Inglewood Unified Sch. Dist., 186 Cal. App. 3d 707
(1986); Fazzolari v. Portland Sch. Dist. No. 1J, 717 P.2d 1210 (Or. Ct. App. 1986);
School City of Gary v. Claudio, 413 N.E.2d 628 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980); McLeod v.
Grant County Sch. Dist. No. 128, 255 P.2d 360 (Wash. 1953).
237. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 320 (1965). The Court in Davis cited this
as an indication of the common law placing "schools on notice that they may be
held responsible under state law for their failure to protect students from the
tortious acts of third parties." 119 S. Ct. at 1671-72.
238. See generally W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAw OF
TORTS §§ 33 & 56 (5th ed., 1984).
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Therefore, while it is necessary to consult the law of the relevant
jurisdiction,23 9 state tort law is a possible source of a claim against a
school corporation where a student has been harassed by another stu-
dent. Where state tort claims are available, they can be combined
with federal claims, either in state court or in federal court based on
supplemental jurisdiction. 24 0
V. CONCLUSION
When student-student racial or sexual harassment is properly
viewed as interference with the victims' right to equal educational op-
portunities, then it is more likely to be viewed as a serious matter that
cannot be brushed aside as normal teasing. Similarly, when such har-
assment is viewed in this manner, the applicability of constitutional
and statutory provisions prohibiting race and sex discrimination be-
comes more apparent. The prospect of liability will cause school offi-
cials to take more seriously their duty to take all reasonable steps to
prevent harassment and, when it occurs despite their best efforts, to
respond promptly with appropriate corrective/remedial efforts. Race
and sex discrimination in elementary and secondary education, even
when it takes the form of harassment by fellow students, cannot be
tolerated. Courts can help address the problem by showing more con-
cern for the victims and less concern for the financial condition of
school corporations that tolerate harassment and the resulting depri-
vation of an equal educational opportunity.
239. See Allan E. Korpela, Annotation, Tort Liability of Public Schools and Institu-
tions of Higher Learning for Injuries Caused by Acts of Fellow Students, 36
A.L.R.3d 330 (1971 & Supp. 1999).
240. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (codifying common law doctrine of pendent jurisdiction).
2000]
